When the Republic of Korea joined 49 of some 57 prospective founding members of the new Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in late June in Beijing to sign the new international financial institution’s Articles of Agreement, there were some noted hold-outs. Strikingly, three of the seven nations that held back were from Southeast Asia.

Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand ― three of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ 10 member states ― as well as Denmark, Kuwait, Poland and South Africa did not sign the accord. The reasons for this vary, and all of them have until the end of the year to join. The Chinese government, however, noted some countries may still have domestic procedures to complete.

This may well be the case for Thailand and Malaysia. As for the Philippines, the nation officially continues to “study” the costs and benefits of membership.

Philippine President Benigno Aquino, at a Nikkei event in Tokyo on June 3, said: “I think it behooves our sense of fiscal responsibility to look at how the governance structure of the AIIB will be, so that the economic help that is supposed to be afforded will not be subject to the vagaries of politics between our countries and the lead proponent.”

More simply put, the context and the “cost of membership” are clear. The Philippines has brought its territorial dispute with Beijing over islands in the South China Sea to a United Nations arbitral tribunal. In such times, why give China another “easy win” and a communications victory in its efforts to establish what might well prove to be a rival to the Manila-based Asian Development Bank and a route to further strengthened economic engagement and political involvement across the region?

Yet, with or without Malaysia, the Philippines or Thailand ― all these nations’ shareholding and voice at the new AIIB would be well below those of largest shareholders China, India and Russia ― the new international institution still has some important questions to answer.

For those that have joined the AIIB club, including South Korea, there is now the challenge of translating what is on paper into a world-class financial institution that will help meet Asia’s infrastructure financing needs while also safeguarding the environment and the livelihoods of those who are affected.

So what should South Korea ask as the AIIB moves forward? Here are three questions.

First, can the AIIB move from rhetoric to reality in building a “lean, clean and green” international financial institution? Execution matters. Clear metrics, strong safeguards and a strategy for implementation are essential.

This will not be easy if shareholders are caught up in the battle for procurement and personnel appointments that has at times plagued other multilateral organizations. One clear indicator of the unwritten influence of China will be what percentage of AIIB staff and leadership will go to Chinese citizens, as well as what share of future procurement on AIIB-financed projects goes to Chinese state-owned enterprises. Transparency and accountability will be true tests of the AIIB once it is up and running.

Second, can China act as a consensus builder and respect all AIIB shareholders even as it continues to pursue its national interests? This is of particular importance to the nations locked in territorial disputes with Beijing. Indeed, China’s increasingly assertive stance has brought it into conflict with not just the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia but also India among other potential borrowers from the AIIB.

Here, China’s past actions at the Asian Development Bank underscore why there is legitimate concern over China’s future behavior at this newest of international financial institutions. During my time on the ADB Board of Directors, I saw firsthand how China’s domestic and international political agenda forced the ADB to change course at times.

In one case, China refused to grant permission to ADB staff to visit the city of Fuzhou to investigate an alleged case of noncompliance with the bank’s safeguard policies. In another case, efforts to provide assistance in one of the poorest parts of India, known as Arunachal Pradesh but claimed in part by the Chinese, were also stymied by China.

Third, to what degree will the AIIB focus not simply on lending more money faster, but also on results by addressing the “little BRIC” ― the bureaucracy, regulation, interventionism and corruption ― that holds back much of Asia’s sustainable development? This will include encouraging a rule of law and a system of good governance essential to private sector-led growth.

South Korea should also take this to heart, particularly in light of the nation’s and the region’s ongoing economic and political challenges. The long-term solution to filling the region’s infrastructure financing gap goes beyond any international financial institution no matter how big the AIIB ― or ADB for that matter ― might eventually become.

Ultimately, the AIIB may well force other multilateral organizations to be more efficient and more effective. The challenge is to ensure that competition driven by the AIIB over projects and programs does not result in a race to the bottom when it comes to social, environmental and other safeguards.

In the run-up to the recent signing ceremony, numerous Western nations as well as South Korea were convinced to join the AIIB as founding members despite the reported objections of the United States and Japan, the only two major global economies who declined to join the AIIB.

The challenge to all shareholders will be to show now that their commitment to shaping the AIIB from the inside into a better bank is more than words alone. Skeptics who maintain that founding members were driven primarily by hopes for future personnel placements and procurement awards will need to be proven wrong. Results will matter more than anything else in silencing critics.

The American comedian Groucho Marx once famously declared, “I don’t want to belong to any club that will accept me as a member.” Going forward, ASEAN’s holdouts must decide by year’s end whether or not to sign on formally to the AIIB. That decision to “join the club” must go beyond factoring in the costs of capital committed or the “privilege” of loans the country might hope to receive in return. All of the major international financial institutions are ultimately political creations of their lead proponents ― despite any soaring language to the contrary. That, too, is what South Korea has already signed on to.

By Curtis S. Chin

Curtis S. Chin, a former U.S. ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, is the managing director of the advisory firm RiverPeak Group, LLC. ― Ed.