새로운 박근혜 정부는 대북억지력 강화, 전작권 전환, 해양주권수호 등 다양한 안보과제를 떠안고 25일 출범했다.

박근혜 정부가 직면한 가장 큰 과제는 세 차례 핵실험과, 지속적인 장거리 미사일 실험으로 군사적 위협수위를 높이고 있는 북한을 어떻게 효율적으로 억제할 것인가이다.

한국전략문제연구소 권태영 고문은, 북한이 핵과 미사일로 위협하며 국지도발을 지속할 가능성이 농후하다면서, 재래식이지만 최첨단 억제수단을 강구해서 북한에게 강력한 메시지를 전달하는 동시에 국민들을 안심시킬 수 있도록 해야 한다고 지적했다.

억지력 강화와 관련해, 전문가들은 2015년 12월로 예정된 전시작전통제권 환수 준비에도 만전을 기해야 한다고 강조했다. 전작권이 전환되면 한국군 사령관이 전시에 작전을 이끌게 되고 미군은 지원하는 역할을 맡게 된다.

전작권 전환과 관련한 핵심 이슈 중 하나는 한미연합지휘체계를 새롭게 구성하는 것이다. 전작권 전환과 함께 기존의 한미연합사가 해체되기 때문이다. 한미는 이와 관련, 새로운 지휘체계 구성을 논의 중이다. 전문가들은 연합사 해체가 북한이 도발할 수 있는 틈을 줄 수 있다고 지적했다.

전작권 전환과 맞물려 한미는 북한과의 전면전을 대비하는 작전계획 5015와 국지도발 계획도 논의 중이다.

작계 5015는 기존의 5027을 대체하게 되는데, 작계 5027의 내용은 현실성이 없다는 지적을 받고 있다. 랜드연구소의 브루스 베넷 연구원은 작계 5027에 따라 전시에 미국이 69만 병력을 한반도에 증원하는 것은 현재 미국이 병력을 순환배치하는 기조와 배치되고 적용이 어려운 것이라 지적했다.

전문가들은 또한 재래식 무기를 사용한 전쟁개념과는 별도로, 핵전쟁을 전제로 하는 작전 계획도 마련해야 한다고 주장한다. 현재 한미는 “맞춤형 억지 전략”을 짜기 위해 논의 중인데 이런 주장들도 감안 될 것으로 기대된다.

북한의 3차 핵실험 후, 보수정치인들은 한국이 핵무장을 하거나 미국의 전술핵을 재배치 해야 한다고 주장하고 있다. 전문가들은 전술핵 재배치는 미국의 비확산 정책과 충돌하고, 미국이 한국에 배치할 지상 전술핵이 없는 상황이라 실현 불가능하다고 지적한다.

미국은 현재 약 760기의 전술핵을 보유하고 있는 것으로 알려져 있고, 그 중 200여기는 NATO 공군에 배치되어 있고 나머지는 미국 본토에 미해군용으로 저장되어 있다.

박근혜 정부는 이와 같은 안보과제와 더불어, 차세대 전투기, 공격형 헬기 도입, 글로벌 호크 무인 정찰기 도입 등 엄청난 비용이 드는 대규모 사업을 결정해야 어려움도 직면하고 있다.

(코리아헤럴드 송상호 기자)







<관련 영문 기사>

New government faces daunting security tasks

By Song Sang-ho

The new Seoul government faces a host of daunting security tasks ranging from deterring increasingly emboldened North Korea, to retaking wartime operational control from the U.S. in 2015, to possible challenges to the country’s maritime interests.

Atop the security agenda for the Park Geun-hye administration is strengthening military capabilities to deal with Pyongyang’s increasing nuclear and missile threats as well as other weapons of mass destruction, experts said.

“Following its third nuclear test on Feb. 12, Pyongyang threatens to conduct fourth and fifth tests as well as missile launches. The regime is unstable and its military threats will increase over time,” said Kwon Tae-young, advisor to the non-profit Korea Research Institute for Strategy.

“As it is unrealistic for now for the South to develop nuclear arms, it should build feasible, credible, non-nuclear, high-tech deterrence capabilities to deal with the North, which would send a strong message to it and help alleviate public anxiety in the South.”

As part of efforts to strengthen peninsular defense, analysts stressed the importance of sufficient preparations to smoothly retake wartime operational control from Washington in December 2015. After the transfer, the South is to lead wartime operations with the U.S. playing a supporting role.

At issue in connection with the OPCON transfer is the construction of a combined command structure. The current South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command is to be dissolved after the transfer. To replace it, the allies have been considering inheriting part of the core CFC features and establishing a small commanding apparatus.

Military experts have opposed the CFC dissolution as it could send the wrong signal to a provocative North Korea. Others expressed concern that establishing the so-called mini-CFC could undermine South Korea’s commanding authority.

“I’m reluctant to see that (CFC) go away. But they (the allies) may well do that. That may well happen in 2015. I think the question we have to ask is what the impact on North Korea of the CFC going away is,” said Bruce Bennett, a military expert at the RAND Corporation, in a recent interview with The Korea Herald.

“Do they become more adventuresome, thinking that U.S. is disengaging? How do we prevent them from becoming more adventurous? That’s a hard problem to work out.”

In line with the OPCON transfer, Seoul and Washington have also been working on drawing up new joint operational plans and procedures to replace existing ones that were crafted on the premise that the U.S. was to lead wartime operations.

The allies have been discussing the creation of an operational plan, known as OPLAN 5015, which would replace the current OPLAN 5027.

Under the current plan, the U.S. is to dispatch its 690,000 troops to the peninsula and mobilize 160 military vessels and 2,500 aircraft within 90 days of the outbreak of a war. But analysts said this plan would be no longer realistic considering a string of factors such as the U.S. decision to reduce its ground troops including marines.

Bennett called the 690,000 troop level under the OPLAN 5027 a “historical number,” stressing it would be no longer applicable given that the U.S. has shifted toward a rotational troop deployment. He added the U.S. troop commitment hinges on what else the U.S. is doing at the time of a peninsular contingency.

“The 690,000 number was an immediate post-Cold War kind of number. The problem of that concept is that works if you’re going to do it only for six months and bring them back home. But if I’m going to have the forces there potentially for years, as we did in Iraq, The U.S.’ got to have a rotational basis,” he said.

“On a rotational basis, if I have 10 divisions, I’m only going to commit about three of them at any given time. Well, three of them is a whole lot less than what we were originally talking about committing. It’s no long applicable because the nature of the rotation is going to take the number lower.”

Kim Yeoul-soo, politics professor at Sungshin Women’s University, said as Seoul and Washington have different security priorities and national interests, the allies might have a tug of war in mapping out new war-related procedures.

“While discussing the OPLAN 5015, there could be some conflict between them over whether to include the concept of the preemptive strikes on North Korea’s nuclear and missile bases and how many assets the U.S. should commit in case of North Korea’s local provocations,” said Kim.

Kim added the allies should also start discussing contingency plans to prepare for North Korea’s possible nuclear attacks as the current war plans including those under discussion are based largely on conventional warfare scenarios.

Seoul has been relying on America’s nuclear umbrella. But following the North’s third nuclear test, some conservatives have floated the idea of South Korea’s nuclear armament and the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear arms.

But experts said the redeployment of U.S. tactical weapons was impractical because it would hamper the U.S. initiatives of non-proliferation and the U.S. does not have ground-based tactical nukes to be deployed to the peninsula. The U.S. is known to have some 760 tactical nukes -- some 200 deployed to the NATO’s Air Force and the remainder for naval forces stored in the U.S. mainland.

To enhance nuclear deterrence against the North, Seoul and Washington have been consulting over a “tailored deterrence strategy” at the bilateral Extended Deterrence Policy Committee. They agreed last year to craft it by 2014.

Apart from war scenarios, the allies have also been in talks over a set of procedures to deal with the North’s provocations and possible contingencies such as a sudden collapse of the regime. They initially planned to complete the plan by January this year, but appeared to take more time before finalizing it.

The major issue is the scope of a potential counterattack, a source said. Seoul argues it should launch a counterstrike on the supporting forces as well the origin of the provocation.

But Washington appears uneasy about Seoul taking too aggressive a stance due to the risk of provocations escalating into a full-blown war, which could drag in both the U.S. and China in at a time both powers are struggling with domestic challenges.

In sync with the OPCON transfer, the Park government also faces a tough challenge to overhaul the military’s top command structure.

The preceding government had sought a military reform aimed at enhancing cooperation among the three armed services and making the top commanding structure “strong, speedy and slim.” But the efforts had foundered amid resistance from retired generals and other experts.

Under the reform plans, the Defense Ministry sought to put four-star chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force under the operational control of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and merge the military command and administration.

Currently, the top officials of the three services only have the authority to lead personnel management, education, logistical support and other administrative affairs. They do not have authority to direct military operations.

“When we are under the wartime operational control of the U.S. commander, the current South Korean commanding structure with the military administration and command separated did not (have serious trouble),” said Kim of Sungshin Women’s University.

“But after the OPCON transfer, the two functions need to be merged into a unitary chain of command (for optimal, efficient operations).”

The new Seoul government also faces tough decisions over an array of costly defense acquisition deals including the high-profile project to purchase a high-end fleet of 60 combat aircraft and others to develop an indigenous middle-class fighter and purchase attack helicopters and Global Hawk spy drones.

(sshluck@heraldcorp.com)