Debate is intensifying in South Korea over whether to send troops to the Strait of Hormuz.
Much of the discussion has been framed as a political dilemma for President Lee Jae Myung. The United States is pressing Seoul to contribute to military operations, while public opposition to deployment remains strong. If Lee accepts the US request, critics warn that Korea could effectively become a participant in the war with Iran, exposing Korean soldiers and even civilians to possible retaliation. If he refuses, relations with Washington could suffer.
Some political commentary has gone even further, treating Lee's predicament almost as an opportunity to score partisan points. Such an attitude is troubling.
Decisions involving war can put the lives of soldiers and civilians at risk. They should be approached with restraint and, whenever possible, bipartisan cooperation rather than partisan calculation.
More importantly, however, the current debate is missing the most fundamental question: What is the cause for Korea to join this war? Before sending troops to war, every nation needs a cause — a compelling reason that can justify putting the lives of its soldiers and citizens at risk. Whether such a cause exists should be determined by at least three tests: legality, necessity and national interest.
Is military participation consistent with international and domestic law? Is military action truly necessary after reasonable alternatives have been exhausted? And is Korea's national interest important enough to justify the risks and costs of participation? Only when these questions can be answered convincingly can military participation claim legitimacy.
History demonstrates why these questions matter. When the US invaded Iraq in 2003, Washington justified the war primarily by claiming that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and had links to terrorist groups. South Korea eventually dispatched troops, influenced by alliance considerations as well as the security rationale Washington presented. But critical elements of that rationale later collapsed: the weapons of mass destruction central to the case for war were not found. The lesson is clear. An ally's request cannot itself constitute sufficient cause for joining a war. The cause must be independently examined and verified.
The Vietnam War offers a different lesson. When President Lyndon Johnson asked South Korea to send troops in the 1960s, Seoul faced a direct military threat from North Korea and viewed the containment of communist expansion as closely connected to its own security. Whatever judgment history makes of that decision, Korea's participation had an identifiable strategic rationale beyond the economic and military benefits negotiated with Washington.
The same three tests should be applied to the current war with Iran.
The war began on Feb. 28 with US and Israeli attacks intended primarily to stop Iran's nuclear program and weaken its military capabilities. Nuclear nonproliferation is undoubtedly an important international norm. But whether war was necessary was unclear from the beginning. Iran and the United States had been engaged in negotiations over the nuclear issue, and Oman, which had played a mediating role, reported progress in the talks.
More troublingly, the stated objectives of the war have repeatedly changed or expanded. Initially, Trump said the goal was to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Later, he spoke of regime change and demanded Iran's unconditional surrender. As the war continued, reopening the Strait of Hormuz became another major objective.
For a country being asked to join an ongoing war, such changes create a fundamental problem: What exactly would Korea be joining the war to achieve? Korea needs a cause not only for joining the war, but also for convincing its people that sending troops is justified. The Strait of Hormuz is vital to Korea, but that alone does not establish a cause for military participation.
The first test is legality. Seoul must determine whether participation has a sufficient basis under international and domestic law. Alliance solidarity cannot substitute for such a legal basis.
The second is necessity. Have diplomatic, economic and multilateral alternatives been exhausted? At this point, the answer is far from clear.
The third test is national interest. Seoul must weigh the benefits against casualties, retaliation and the risk of deeper involvement in an open-ended war. It must also consider the potentially lasting damage to Korea's traditionally important relationship with Iran. Turning a country with which Korea has maintained significant diplomatic and economic ties into a military adversary would itself be a major national loss.
The exact mission also matters. Maritime surveillance, mine clearance, protection of civilian shipping, logistical support for US forces and direct combat against Iranian forces are not the same thing. Before making a decision, Seoul needs to know precisely what mission Washington is requesting, what military objective it serves and how long the operation might last.
This leads to a simple principle. A compelling cause is a necessary condition for participation in war, not a sufficient one. Without such a cause, Korea should not send its troops. If a compelling cause can be established through the tests of legality, necessity and national interest, Seoul can then consider the costs, risks, scale and form of participation.
Seen this way, Korea does not need to agonize over whether it can withstand US pressure. Nor should the debate begin with whether Lee can survive the political consequences of saying yes or no. There is no room for partisan calculation or simply accepting the debate as framed by others when war involves people's lives and a nation's future.
The burden of explanation should come first.
Washington is asking its allies to share the risks of a war whose objectives have repeatedly shifted. It therefore has an obligation to explain clearly why Korean military participation is necessary and what purpose Korean soldiers would be asked to serve.
Seoul should not be under pressure to explain why it hesitates to join the war. Washington should be under pressure to explain the cause for Korea to join it.
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Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
