Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's surprise visit to Dandong, China, last week generated conflicting interpretations. Some analysts linked it to a possible North Korea-US summit; others interpreted Chinese President Xi Jinping's absence as evidence of friction between Pyongyang and Beijing. Unfortunately, Kim's determination to expand economic cooperation with China received insufficient attention.

Understanding Kim's diplomacy requires examining his objectives and calculations rather than relying on preconceived expectations. His record reveals three characteristics that explain the visit.

First, Kim takes substantial diplomatic risks to pursue economic development. Although regime security and nuclear deterrence remain priorities, economic progress is central to his agenda. His 2018 diplomatic offensive illustrates this tendency. After years of confrontation, Kim pursued summits with South Korea, the United States and China, calculating that diplomacy could open economic opportunities. The failed 2019 Hanoi summit exposed the risks but did not end his economic ambitions.

His Dandong visit reflects similar calculations. With a major Chinese Communist Party meeting approaching, a summit with Xi was unlikely. Kim visited nevertheless, seeing an opportunity to encourage cooperation following the opening of the new Yalu River bridge. He chose to act rather than wait.

Second, Kim makes proactive gestures to encourage reciprocal concessions. By acting first, he creates expectations of a response. In May 2018, North Korea publicly demolished entrances to its nuclear test tunnels at Punggye-ri, presenting the action as evidence of commitment to denuclearization. Pyongyang subsequently called for corresponding measures, including sanctions relief.

During President Moon Jae-in's September 2018 visit to Pyongyang, Kim offered extraordinary hospitality, including an opportunity for Moon to address a massive audience in Pyongyang and an excursion to Mount Paektu. Beyond ceremony, these gestures created expectations of further cooperation from Seoul. Ahead of Hanoi, Kim offered to dismantle the Yongbyon nuclear complex for partial sanctions relief. Although it was a conditional proposal rather than a completed concession, it pressured Washington to respond. Though different, these episodes reveal a pattern: Kim takes the initiative to generate momentum and encourage reciprocity.

His Dandong visit may represent another variation of this approach. By personally demonstrating his commitment to expanded economic cooperation, Kim effectively encouraged China's leadership to respond with tangible measures.

Third, Kim values dramatic gestures and strategic timing. Carefully staged events can attract attention beyond their practical significance. The succession of inter-Korean and North Korea-US summits in 2018 transformed Kim's international image almost overnight. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he also recognized opportunities to strengthen relations with Moscow, eventually elevating bilateral cooperation to an unprecedented level. His brief Dandong visit similarly generated extensive speculation about his diplomatic intentions. Its timing, symbolism and unexpected nature ensured international attention despite the limited duration of the trip.

These characteristics provide a useful framework for understanding the visit. They also expose weaknesses in some interpretations offered by outside observers.

Consider the suggestion that Kim visited China to coordinate a possible summit with US President Donald Trump during the APEC gathering in Shenzhen. Such coordination is conceivable, but possibility should not be confused with probability. If consultation on a major North Korea-US summit had been the principal objective, a direct meeting with Xi would have carried particular importance. Instead, Kim met Wang Huning, a senior member of China's top leadership. Wang's participation was significant, but it appeared more consistent with bilateral economic cooperation and a gesture of Chinese hospitality.

The opposite interpretation is equally questionable. Some observers regarded Xi's absence as evidence of strained relations between Beijing and Pyongyang. This overlooks the circumstances. Xi was preparing for important party meetings, while Kim's visit involved a brief program in a border city. Expecting the Chinese president to travel to Dandong for such an occasion would be unreasonable. Moreover, Wang ranks among China's most senior leaders, and the reception reportedly included arrangements made under Xi's direction. These circumstances hardly suggest diplomatic neglect. The Chinese leadership appears to have provided substantial courtesy appropriate to the visit's scale and purpose.

A more straightforward interpretation is that Kim sought to accelerate economic exchanges with China while demonstrating his determination to pursue economic development. The problem extends beyond this particular visit. Shortly beforehand, an unsubstantiated rumor about Kim's death circulated internationally despite glaring inconsistencies in its underlying claims. The episode demonstrated how easily speculation about North Korea can spread without adequate verification.

Unfounded rumors and questionable expert interpretations are not identical problems. Nevertheless, both highlight the importance of distinguishing verified facts from assumptions. South Korea has accumulated considerable expertise on North Korea. Many researchers have devoted their careers to careful analysis under difficult information conditions. The concern is not the absence of research, but the tendency of political polarization to influence how available evidence is interpreted.

Those expecting a diplomatic breakthrough may interpret ambiguous developments as signs of imminent negotiations. Those anticipating confrontation may regard the same developments as evidence of deteriorating relations. In both cases, expectations can precede analysis rather than emerge from it. Kim should not be judged through partisan lenses. His behavior must be examined through his objectives, available options, political constraints and actual results. He can be calculating and ambitious while also making serious mistakes. This distinction matters for South Korea.

For Washington, North Korea is one of several foreign policy challenges. For Beijing, it is an important consideration in regional security and strategic competition. For Seoul, however, developments in North Korea directly affect national security, economic prospects and the future of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

South Korea, therefore, has an especially compelling reason to develop an independent, evidence-based understanding of Pyongyang. Accurate analysis does not mean sympathy for Kim's government. Nor does recognizing his diplomatic calculations require accepting his demands. It means separating political preferences from factual judgments and placing South Korea's own national interests at the center of policy decisions. Understanding Kim Jong-un is not about defending him. It is about defending South Korea's national interests.

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Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.


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