Kim Jong-un’s recent commissioning of North Korea’s largest-ever warship, the Choe Hyon, alongside a fleet of strategic nuclear cruisers, signals that the threat has broken out of its peninsula box.
The US-South Korea alliance must thus adapt to this new reality. Action is urgent because broader regional tensions are surging as well, and the new US National Defense Strategy demands that allies assume “primary responsibility” for theater defense.
Fortunately, this mandate aligns well with President Lee Jae Myung’s prioritization of the upcoming conditions-based transfer of wartime operational control from the US to South Korean forces by 2030 or earlier.
Rather than clinging to traditional, transactional burden-sharing, Washington and Seoul should seize this moment to build a long-term alliance for the future. By elevating South Korea into a key regional security provider, the alliance can expand the strategic reach and operational flexibility of the United States throughout the Indo-Pacific.
To achieve this new defense matrix, the US and South Korea should pursue seven steps.
First, they should address the axis that enables Pyongyang. While Beijing remains North Korea’s longtime economic and diplomatic anchor, Moscow’s growing military partnership with Pyongyang, including its tech-for-manpower swaps, has pushed South Korean support for an independent nuclear capability to unprecedented heights. To address this, the US-South Korea Nuclear Consultative Group should better integrate Seoul’s conventional “kill chain” strike capabilities with US strategic assets. Washington should also support the Lee administration’s roadmap to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-propelled attack submarines to counter North Korea’s maritime threat and dampen Seoul’s domestic nuclear debate.
Second, the alliance should scale up and industrialize its deterrence framework to dominate the asymmetric, day-to-day tactical battlespace. To counter gray-zone actions, Washington and Seoul should develop synchronized operational protocols and shared rules of engagement below the threshold of armed conflict. To disrupt the digital financial networks funding Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, they should operationalize shared cybersecurity and AI frameworks. A joint, data-linked autonomous systems initiative should also mass-produce interoperable, low-cost drone swarms and unmanned vessels to secure dominance over contested waters.
Third, the alliance should move past Peninsula-bound roles to manage a Taiwan Strait or South China Sea crisis without creating a dual-theater blind spot. A modernized framework should match South Korea’s advanced conventional missiles with US theater-wide surveillance and intelligence assets. To facilitate the upcoming conditions-based wartime operational control transfer, the Combined Forces Command should also evolve into an agile, multidomain command sharing real-time space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. Concurrently, the newly established South Korean Strategic Command should link up with the US Strategic Command and the US Pacific Command.
Fourth, the alliance should be more tightly woven into regional minilateral networks. Rather than relying on sporadic joint exercises, the US, South Korea and Japan should institutionalize the real-time missile-warning data systems established at the Camp David summit to counter synchronized provocations. Seoul should bridge these networks by formalizing defense-technology pipelines with the Philippines and Australia to help secure vital sea lanes. Moreover, aligning allied production lines should leverage South Korea’s high-volume manufacturing capacity to replenish defense stockpiles beyond the Indo-Pacific.
Fifth, the US and South Korea should deepen their maritime industrial integration, leveraging the recently concluded Korea-US Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative. While current cooperation focuses on maintenance, repair and overhaul to service American naval vessels, the allies should look toward a stronger production partnership. South Korean shipbuilders should invest to revitalize underutilized American shipyards, while US defense primes co-produce auxiliary and battle-force hulls with South Korean firms. Pairing South Korean manufacturing speed with American naval design, while securing resilient, allied supply chains for critical components, will alleviate fleet bottleneck pressures and deliver a powerful joint advantage to both countries.
Sixth, the alliance should scale up and industrialize supply-chain protection through a geoeconomic “tech-shield” framework. Under the bilateral New Frontiers agenda, the allies should institutionalize the security of critical emerging technology pipelines, semiconductor manufacturing and rare earth elements. Denying adversaries the ability to weaponize economic dependencies to choke off precision-missile manufacturing transforms supply-chain resilience into a vital pillar of deterrence.
Finally, the US and South Korea should lock in a defense architecture capable of enduring regional volatility. They should codify the Nuclear Consultative Group framework to protect deterrence from domestic political shifts. The alliance should also adapt to demographic realities. To counter a shrinking South Korean active-duty workforce, the alliance should optimize for speed over mass by modernizing Seoul’s reserve forces to mobilize and integrate with US forces rapidly.
Driven by a robust defense budget and a recent commitment to a bold 3.5 percent GDP target, South Korea has established itself as what the Trump administration calls a “model ally.” Adopting these proposed steps while prioritizing long-term strategic thinking — particularly through training the next generation of allied security practitioners — will allow Washington and Seoul to transform their partnership into an unshakeable, technologically dominant force for the future.
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David Santoro
David Santoro is president and CEO of the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum, which runs the annual Honolulu Defense Forum. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
