Speculation abounds over US President Donald Trump’s signaling that he hopes to restart talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. From a South Korean point of view, the unpredictability of Trump’s policies combines with the extreme volatility of domestic politics to cast an unsettling shadow over the future of the divided peninsula.
The complete rupture in inter-Korean dialogue over the past few years under now-impeached President Yoon Suk Yeol adds to the concern that Seoul may be sidelined if talks resume between Washington and Pyongyang.
On the campaign trail, Trump claimed he is pals with the “smart guy” in Pyongyang. Kim has not flatly rejected the showman politician’s repeated overtures, but he has declared the “toughest” anti-American stance, saying that his past negotiations with the United States only confirmed the latter's “unchangeable hostility” toward his country.
Trump’s talks with Kim in Singapore in 2018 and then in Hanoi in 2019 were the first-ever meetings between a sitting US president and his North Korean counterpart. Kim sought economic concessions from Trump in return for shrinking the North’s nuclear arms capability. But the two sides failed to agree about the scope of the tradeoffs, leaving Kim embittered and disillusioned. Since then, he has turned down an increasingly militant course, accelerating the pace of weapons testing activities to build nuclear missiles to reach the continental United States and forging a security alliance with Russia.
Kim obviously is no longer desperate to normalize relations with Washington. His calculated Russian gambit is paying off. By supplying heavy artillery shells and deploying an estimated 12,000 troops to support Vladimir Putin’s war effort in Ukraine, Kim is gaining much-needed hard currency and probably sensitive military technologies to refine his nuclear arsenal as well. At the same time, the North has emerged from its longstanding patterns of self-reliance and seclusion.
Yet, few doubt the possibility of the Trump-Kim bromance diplomacy being rekindled. Regardless of the widespread skepticism about substantial, near-term progress to be achieved based on the personal rapport between the two leaders, it appears to be a matter of time when they decide to meet. For Trump, back in the White House for his second term, his immediate foreign policy aims are helping to end the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. North Korea as an active participant in the war against Ukraine can possibly be factored into the peace talks between Kyiv and Moscow, but it is hardly a decisive element.
North Korea, on its part, will likely spend much of the first year of Trump presidency 2.0 proving that Kim is not who he was eight years ago. If they meet again, Trump will face a North Korean leader who is much more assertive than before, and Kim obviously must be aware of Trump’s transactional, impulsive approach to decision-making and short attention span. Any negotiations will be different to those of in 2017, with a higher bar set by Kim in the intervening years.
Before returning to the negotiating table, North Korea is likely to set preconditions that include a halt to US bilateral military drills with South Korea and trilateral drills involving Japan as well as the deployment of its strategic assets in South Korea. The North has strongly rebuked the US-led exercises as invasion rehearsals.
The Trump administration, in return, may demand that the North discontinue its nuclear and long-range missile tests. Trump may regard these moves as practical options to cut defense spending and reduce security threats at the same time. The subsequent security concerns among South Koreans should be another matter to address.
For the US, the “utopian” goal for North Korea is CVID: Complete, Verifiable and Irreversible Dismantling of the North Korean nuclear program. But that is Pyongyang’s red line. Even if preconditions for a summit are satisfied, Kim will likely hesitate to come to the table if the agenda prioritizes CVID.
Trump already has referred to the North as a “nuclear power” (if not an NPT-designated “nuclear weapon state”). If he is pragmatic enough, the conceptual shift could lead Trump to a recalibration in negotiations to measured arms control. Thus, a so-called “small deal” could be sought as a near-term goal, while the ultimate objective remains the same, the North’s complete denuclearization, accompanied by mutually credible confidence-building measures.
But even a modest deal may not be a watershed. Considering Trump’s past behavior, he may simply declare victory and fail to make sure follow-up procedures are done, leaving the aftermath of the deal in disarray.
Overall, the best possible eventual outcome of this peacebuilding process may be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia, assuring permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the region free from nuclear threats.
A major driver in the momentum for North Korea to join this foreseeably long and winding process would be the painful realization that its ties with Russia and China alone will not ensure its growth and prosperity beyond mere survival. To spearhead this tough process, South Korea, for its part, will need to undertake sweeping reforms in mindset to upend outdated "Red Scare" ideology as well as extreme political polarization. Social consensus and shared values across the political spectrum are essential to overcome perennial division and unrest.
Lee Kyong-hee
Lee Kyong-hee is a former editor-in-chief of The Korea Herald. The views expressed here are the writer's own. -- Ed.
