Tensions between South and North Korea are rising after mine explosions near the Military Demarcation Line seriously injured three South Korean soldiers. The Ministry of National Defense concluded that the mines had been planted by North Korea south of the MDL and vowed to respond firmly. The military began clearing mines in the area. North Korea denied responsibility and accused South Korea of staging the incident.
Many South Koreans are angry and call for retaliatory measures. They argue that because soldiers were badly injured by mines illegally planted by North Korea, Seoul must take corresponding action. Such anger is understandable. But public anger and state action must be distinguished. Anger may be justified, but the response must be calculated.
The Korean Peninsula is not technically at peace. Hostilities were suspended by the 1953 Armistice Agreement, not ended by a peace treaty. Even a small military incident can develop into a larger confrontation if mishandled. However, this does not mean South Korea should always exercise restraint. If North Korea deliberately attacks the South, Seoul must respond swiftly, accurately and sufficiently.
What, then, constitutes the right response? Past inter-Korean military confrontations suggest three broad criteria: the nature of the act, the severity of the incident and the appropriateness of the response. The first is the nature of the act. The key question is whether North Korea deliberately carried out a provocation. Not every military incident causing damage constitutes an intentional armed provocation. One side may misinterpret the other's military movement as an attack, while different understandings of a boundary can cause unintended confrontations. A planned attack and an accidental or mistaken action cannot be treated alike. The clearer the hostile intent, the stronger the justification for a forceful response.
The second criterion is the severity of the incident. Three factors matter: the scale of casualties and material damage; the seriousness of violations of the Armistice Agreement, inter-Korean agreements or other applicable rules; and whether the action is repeated or poses a continuing risk. An isolated incident and recurring military action have different security implications.
The third criterion is the appropriateness of the response. Five questions should be asked. Is the response relevant to the act? Is it proportionate to the nature and severity of the incident? Will it remove the danger, prevent recurrence or deter another provocation? Does it create an excessive risk of escalation? And is it consistent with domestic and international law, the Armistice Agreement and applicable inter-Korean agreements?
Past confrontations offer useful lessons. Naval clashes in the West Sea in 1999, 2002 and 2009 all began with North Korean vessels crossing the Northern Limit Line. The First Battle of Yeonpyeong in 1999 was generally seen as successfully repelling a North Korean challenge while preventing unnecessary escalation. The Second Battle of Yeonpyeong in 2002, however, left six South Korean sailors dead and exposed problems with rigid rules of engagement. Procedures were subsequently simplified and field commanders given greater discretion, contributing to a faster response during the Battle of Daecheong in 2009.
North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 offered another lesson. It was a deliberate armed attack that killed military personnel and civilians. South Korea returned fire, but its response was criticized for failing to suppress the threat sufficiently.
The 2015 land mine incident provides the most relevant comparison. South Korea concluded that North Korean soldiers had crossed the MDL and deliberately planted wooden-box mines along a South Korean patrol route. Seoul classified it as an intentional provocation and resumed loudspeaker broadcasts. Pyongyang denied responsibility, and tensions rose sharply. After high-level negotiations, North Korea expressed regret over the soldiers' injuries, while South Korea suspended the broadcasts.
The current incident differs in one crucial respect. Concluding that the mines were planted by North Korea is not necessarily the same as proving that they were planted to attack South Korean soldiers. If the two Koreas have different understandings of the precise location of the MDL, that must be considered in assessing intent. The fact that the explosion occurred away from a route normally used by South Korean patrols may also be relevant. This does not automatically absolve North Korea of responsibility. North Korean forces may have known they were operating south of the MDL and planted the mines anyway. If Pyongyang refuses South Korean proposals to clarify the boundary and prevent similar incidents, suspicions of deliberate action will grow. The human cost is very serious. Three South Korean soldiers suffered devastating injuries. But the severity of the injuries and the question of intentional provocation are different matters. The latter must be established by evidence.
South Korea should demand that North Korea acknowledge its responsibility, remove any remaining danger, prevent recurrence and take appropriate action regarding the soldiers' injuries. Pyongyang's likely refusal does not make these demands meaningless. Responsibility should first be established and corrective action demanded. Seoul can then determine what additional measures are warranted.
Whether loudspeaker broadcasts or additional economic sanctions are appropriate should be considered separately. A measure does not become appropriate merely because it inflicts pain on North Korea. Seoul should ask whether it is related to the incident, can prevent recurrence, is proportionate and provides benefits that outweigh the risk of military escalation.
Conversely, if further investigation establishes that North Korea deliberately planted mines south of the MDL to target South Korean soldiers, the conclusion should be different. That would constitute a planned military provocation, warranting a firm and sufficient response. The choice is not between being tough and being restrained. The task is to determine precisely what North Korea did, assess how serious it was and select the response best suited to the facts. A strong response does not always protect security, just as restraint does not always preserve peace. What protects security is the right response to the right situation. Anger is not a strategy.
Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
