As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney recently proclaimed, the old global order is collapsing rapidly under the weight of great-power rivalry, the “America First” policies of the Trump administration, and rising geopolitical tensions and conflicts. The system established some 80 years ago — built on a rules-based, liberal international order—can no longer adequately serve today’s increasingly volatile and uncertain world. In its place, many analysts envision a new order that is less universal and more flexible in addressing global challenges. A more plurilateral system — based on coalitions of like-minded countries — is suggested as an alternative to the current universal framework, which often prioritizes process over outcomes.
If and when this new order takes shape, where does South Korea fit? Carney specifically called for a more active role for middle powers such as Korea, alongside Canada, Japan, Australia and other liberal democracies. These like-minded countries, he argued, should band together to counter increasingly unilateral and predatory policies by major powers. For Korea, however, this is no simple task. Heavily reliant on the United States for security and on China for economic ties, Korea cannot easily recalibrate its alliances or diversify partnerships without facing significant risks.
Yet this does not mean Korea should retreat from a larger role. On the contrary, the international community increasingly expects Korea to assume greater responsibility in global affairs, given its considerable economic, technological, military and cultural capabilities. In areas such as digital governance, global health, climate policy and development cooperation, Korea is well-positioned to lead — or at least to act as a bridge between the Global North and the Global South.
Korea has previously sought to play such a role through initiatives like MIKTA, a coalition of middle powers including Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey and Australia. The group aimed to address global challenges that major powers were unable or unwilling to tackle. However, the initiative has largely lost momentum. The five members differ significantly in political systems, economic development levels and cultural backgrounds, limiting their ability to generate meaningful outcomes.
Instead, Korea may find greater success by working more closely with countries that share similar political and economic systems. In addition to geographically proximate partners such as Japan, Australia and New Zealand, Korea can strengthen ties with Canada and European nations. Recent strains in transatlantic relations — partly driven by US skepticism toward traditional alliances — may even create new opportunities for such cooperation.
Carney’s remarks at the Davos forum, calling for coalitions of like-minded countries, were widely praised as a bold vision but also criticized for lacking concrete proposals. Meanwhile, Finland’s President Alexander Stubb offered a more detailed framework in a recent article in Foreign Affairs. Representing a small country facing a powerful neighbor, Russia, Stubb emphasized the importance of diplomatic diversification for small and middle powers. His concept of a “multivector” foreign policy advocates building relationships with multiple actors rather than relying on any single bloc.
More specifically, Stubb proposes “value-based realism,” a concept that combines universal values with pragmatic national interests. At first glance, this may appear contradictory: It upholds principles such as the rule of law while also acknowledging cultural and political differences. In essence, it calls for principled commitment to core values alongside pragmatic flexibility in matters of national security.
Based on this approach, Stubb also advocates reforming major international institutions. To better engage an increasingly disillusioned Global South, he argues, the Global West must restructure organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — institutions that still reflect the power distribution of the post-World War II era. These reforms should expand the voice and voting power of middle and smaller states while enhancing transparency and accountability.
Among these institutions, trade and economic bodies are arguably in greatest need of reform, particularly in the aftermath of the Trump administration’s tariff wars. This issue is especially critical for Korea, whose economy depends heavily on trade. The long-held belief in free trade as a universal solution is increasingly being questioned, particularly as China exploits the system through industrial subsidies and non-tariff barriers.
Rather than applying uniform rules of nondiscrimination and preferential treatments to all members, as the WTO does now, some analysts now advocate a differentiated system that distinguishes between rule followers and rule violators. Under such a framework, coalitions of compliant countries could coordinate to impose penalties — such as higher tariffs — on persistent rule breakers like China.
Such changes would pose significant challenges for Korea. China remains Korea’s largest trading partner. Any effort to distance itself from China — or to exclude China from emerging trade coalitions — would entail considerable economic costs.
There will inevitably be trade-offs and disruptions as Korea adapts to a new global order. After all, it has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the existing system. Yet as a responsible middle power with global ambitions, Korea may have little choice but to accept these costs. In the long run, taking on a more proactive role in shaping the emerging order may prove not only necessary but also advantageous.
Lee Byung-jong
Lee Byung-jong is a former Seoul correspondent for Newsweek, The Associated Press and Bloomberg News. He is a professor at the School of Global Service at Sookmyung Women’s University in Seoul. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.
khnews@heraldcorp.com
