Key foreign, security policy officials hint at shift to risk reduction, positioning dialogue as a crucial tactical tool
US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited a lingering question over his North Korea strategy: Will he once again pursue high-stakes summitry with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in pursuit of denuclearization, or will he take a fundamentally different course in a vastly changed strategic landscape?
Early signals from Trump's key foreign and security advisers point to a significant shift: Denuclearization may no longer be the central focus.
In essence, Washington seems to be pivoting toward threat reduction and risk management as practical priorities aligned with Trump’s “America First” doctrine and a more hard-nosed realpolitik, both of which prioritize national security and interests.
Key officials have also notably characterized dialogue as a tactical tool to reduce threats and de-escalate tensions, rather than as a diplomatic endgame.
Such shifts appear driven by a fundamental reality: The Kim regime Trump once courted through three high-stakes summits — including the abruptly collapsed Hanoi meeting in February 2019 — is no longer the same. The breakdown of that summit, where Trump walked away without a deal, led Pyongyang to recalibrate its strategy and take a more confrontational, tougher stance against Washington.
North Korea has transformed into a more defiant and emboldened adversary of the US, inscribing its policy of bolstering its nuclear capabilities in its constitution and resurrecting a Cold War-era military alliance with Russia through a treaty.
Recognizing these complexities, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio provided a preview of the future of North Korea policy, underscoring the need for a fundamental reassessment.
“There has to be an appetite for a very serious look at broader North Korean policies,” he said in January during his congressional confirmation hearing, calling for a strategic overhaul that brings together key stakeholders to rethink and inject creativity into US policy.
While the Trump 2.0 North Korea policy remains under review, an amalgamation of remarks from his top foreign and security policy advisers — both before and after their appointments — offers a window into a potential shift in North Korea policy.
At this juncture, an analysis of their statements spanning the past decade — including confirmation hearings, interviews and public speeches — offers deeper insight into why these shifts are now under consideration, revealing the evolution of key officials’ perspectives on North Korea issues, particularly Kim's nuclear arsenal.
Beyond Rubio, the foreign and security policy team includes Allison Hooker, the nominee for undersecretary of state for political affairs, and principal deputy national security adviser Alex Wong — both of whom directly engaged with North Korean counterparts during Trump’s first term — as well as national security adviser Mike Waltz, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard and Trump's presidential envoy for special missions, Richard Grenell.
Denuclearization no longer priority
A notable trend has emerged, with the once-sacred focus on denuclearization in North Korea policy fading in the confirmation hearings of key officials in Trump’s second term.
This suggests that while the Trump administration has reaffirmed its "resolute commitment to the complete denuclearization" of North Korea in written statements, it will likely remain merely a rhetorical policy goal.
The first clear sign of the change appeared during Rubio’s confirmation hearing, where he outlined de-escalation, risk reduction and crisis management as key goals for North Korea policy, citing two major factors driving the shift.
First is the inherently challenging nature of achieving North Korea’s denuclearization. Second is North Korea’s engagement in conflicts beyond the Korean Peninsula, specifically its weapons supplies and troop deployments in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
“So all of this needs to be taken in conjunction and looking at the policy and seeing what can we now do that … stabilizes that situation, that lowers the risk of an inadvertent war, be it between South Korea and North Korea, maybe including Japan at this point, and ultimately the United States,” Rubio said. “What can we do to prevent a crisis without encouraging other nation-states to pursue their own nuclear weapons program? That's the solution we'd like to get to.”
Director of National Intelligence Gabbard aligned with Rubio’s stance, stating, “US policy priorities towards North Korea should center on our national security interests of reducing the threat posed by its nuclear weapons and missile programs,” in her statement for a congressional confirmation hearing in January.
“The US should aim to reduce tensions, prevent conflict and foster conditions for long-term resolution to the security challenges posed by North Korea,” Gabbard added.
Growing up in Hawaii, Gabbard has said she has firsthand awareness of Pyongyang’s threats and has long called for the US to take action toward threat reduction, such as dialogue. Located about 7,000 kilometers from North Korea, the state also revived its Cold War-era nuclear attack warning siren in December 2017, amid heightened tensions.
“Having spent most of my life in the Asia-Pacific region, I have a unique understanding of the national security threat posed by North Korea’s increasing missile and nuclear weapons capabilities, given my home state of Hawaii is well within their strike capabilities,” Gabbard added.
Deputy Defense Secretary nominee Stephen Feinberg in February likewise said, "We must also seek to stem the growth of DPRK nuclear and missile arsenals,” referring to North Korea's formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
Trump’s pick for undersecretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, has publicly advocated that the US policy goal should be something attainable.
“I think, obviously, denuclearization is not a realistic objective at this point," Colby said in a video interview released in June 2024. “Diplomatically, I think a plausible goal for diplomacy with Kim Jong-un would be limiting its (North Korea's) long-range striking power, not because we're saying that Americans are more important than Koreans, but rather because the extended deterrence model could work if we could limit North Korea's long-range striking power."
Why the pivot on N. Korea policy
These recurring remarks about a potential shift in North Korea policy toward threat reduction and risk management likely reflect a clear-eyed recognition of reality.
Statements from Trump’s advisers — before and after taking office — underscore a shared belief that Kim’s nuclear arsenal is indispensable for his survival, with the fates of Ukraine and Libya — both once nuclear-armed — only reinforcing his grip on nuclear weapons.
Rubio repeatedly stated, since long before his appointment, Kim would never give up nuclear weapons as a key tool for maintaining his dictatorial power, and reiterated during his January hearing that Kim “views nuclear weapons as his insurance policy to stay in power.” Rubio further explained that Kim’s nuclear development has remained undeterred by sanctions, describing Kim as a “40-something-year-old dictator.”
Hooker also has publicly expressed, on multiple occasions, fading optimism about the chances of achieving North Korea’s denuclearization.
“I used to be quite an optimist when it came to the question of whether the North would denuclearize,” she said during a November 2022 forum hosted by the Washington Times Foundation, describing a change in her stance for the first time in some 20 years. “Kim Jong-un and the North Korean leadership are relearning the lessons of Libya through what has happened in Ukraine. They understand that their nuclear deterrent is necessary to avoid becoming vulnerable to invasion or occupation.”
“I honestly think that, at least in its current configuration, the regime values these weapons programs not just as a status symbol, but as a matter of national security. Regime security is the utmost priority,” Hooker also said in October 2023 during a forum hosted by the Korea Society.
Prior to taking on the role of director of national intelligence, Gabbard repeatedly claimed that the fates of Moammar Gadhafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and US attempts to oust Bashar Assad in Syria, have served as lessons for Kim, further entrenching his reliance on a nuclear weapons arsenal.
Gabbard in February 2019 said in a post on social platform X that Kim Jong-un “sees them as his only deterrent from the US coming in and trying to topple his regime."
Another key factor driving the shift in North Korea policy and prompting the US to heighten the urgency of managing North Korea issues is the regime's military alliance with Russia, starkly exemplified by the North's troop dispatches and weapons supplies to the front line with Ukraine. North Korea’s engagement in the war followed the signing of a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty in June 2024.
The US has also assessed that Russia intends to transfer advanced satellite and space technologies to North Korea — capabilities that could be repurposed for developing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the US mainland.
“Unfortunately, recent events now also have them engaged in conflicts beyond the Korean Peninsula, in fact providing troops and weaponry to the Russians in their effort in Ukraine,” Rubio said at the January hearing.
Hooker pointed out that “the most significant change” since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit in February 2019 “has been North Korea's relationship with Russia, and what Kim Jong-un and the regime are gaining from that relationship — fuel and food, but also technical know-how, we assume, for their satellite programs,” during a seminar co-hosted by the Korea University and TriForum in mid-November 2024.
Waltz has also been vocal about the gravity of North Korea’s challenges in the broader context of security threats posed by collusion among US adversaries, such as calling for tougher actions against North Korea’s deepening military ties with Russia, which he has publicly labeled as an “unholy alliance” in media interviews.
During his visit to the Demilitarized Zone that separates the two Koreas in 2023, Waltz said, "I do worry about a Taiwan Strait conflict where Kim Jong-un sees an opportunity and tries to take advantage of it.”
“The bigger picture is that the threat from North Korea and its backers isn’t just a South Korea problem. It’s an East Asia problem. It’s a regional problem. It’s a global problem at this point.”
Feinberg also reinforced concerns over North Korea’s role in a broader anti-US axis, warning: "China, Russia, Iran and North Korean cooperation in Ukraine and other regions suggest a common interest in weakening US influence and alliances globally,” he said at his February hearing. “Its (North Korea's) recent deployment of combat forces to Russia is also of concern.”
Dialogue as tactical tool
Team Trump 2.0 has notably advocated the strategic benefits of dialogue as a tactical means of threat reduction and risk management.
Speaking at the 2025 Conservative Political Action Conference on Feb. 21, Grenell emphasized, "I don't think that talking means that you're weak. I actually think talking is a tactic to get to a goal, and we’ve seen with President Trump — he can show up with Kim Jong-un, and we need to be able to have these conversations with the Russians."
Grenell also clarified that the purpose of dialogue is its benefit to US national interests.
“We articulate very clearly that under Donald Trump, we don't do regime change. We are going to deal with the countries that are in front of us. And our criteria is not, 'How do we make that country better?' but rather, 'How do we make America better, stronger and more prosperous for the people who live here?'"
Grenell defended Trump’s direct engagement with adversaries, emphasizing that his priority is “to do everything I can to keep Americans prosperous and safe” in a video interview with the German newspaper Bild in July 2024.
“So that's why he crossed the line and went in to see Kim Jong-un. Kim Jong-un was firing missiles, very hostile towards us, threatening where I live in Los Angeles,” Grenell said. “I wouldn't say that they (Trump and Kim) are friends, but I would say that they talk, and I would say that he's maneuvering to protect Americans. It's the same with Vladimir Putin.”
Rubio justified Trump’s diplomacy with Kim, arguing that while it did not yield “enduring” outcomes, it helped de-escalate tensions. “He stopped testing missiles. That didn’t stop the development of the program, but at least it calmed the situation quite a bit,” he noted during his January hearing.
Wong also underscored the importance of steering North Korea into talks rather than allowing it to remain locked in a cycle of provocation and military expansion. Speaking at a Hudson Institute event in 2021, Wang repeatedly underscored that a key principle of North Korea policy “pushes the DPRK, channels them into talks and out of this cyclical posture, this default posture of provocation and steady improvement in its weaponry.”
How to initiate, frame dialogue
One of the greatest challenges on the horizon is how to interact with North Korea, overcoming its entrenched reluctance to engage in dialogue. Despite being made some time ago, Wong’s remarks offer valuable insights in that regard.
In an April 2021 commentary, he suggested that the US should "be creative in establishing unorthodox channels to seed ideas — whether inducements, warnings or new negotiation mechanisms — directly into Kim’s inner circle."
Hooker also raised the interesting notion that the starting point of dialogue with Pyongyang might not even be the nuclear weapons program.
“Unless the war between Russia and Ukraine ends and North Korean soldiers get out of Russia, I can imagine the first piece of business would be that and would be talking about that instead of, perhaps, the nuclear issue and arms control,” Hooker said during the November 2024 seminar.
Another key challenge is how to frame dialogue with North Korea, which remains one of the most difficult dilemmas — as North Korea will refuse to engage if the US makes denuclearization the main focus, while the US must still maintain denuclearization as the ultimate goal.
Hooker acknowledged the value of holding talks, saying, “It's worth exploring with the North what they're willing to accept and willing to do — making an offer to them” through talks, in the prior November 2022 seminar.
At the same time, Hooker raised the critical question: “I guess what I would ask is, sort of on the other side of that, what our ultimate goal would be. Are we looking at this? Is this going to be threat reduction? Is this going to be arms control? ... If they're not going to accept denuclearization talks, are we going to end up having to call it something else?”
Hooker and Wong, however, maintained that the US should not frame dialogue with North Korea as arms control talks — something that would favor Pyongyang — solely for the sake of reviving dialogue.
Wong warned that arms control talks “will let North Korea maintain the nuclear capability, while also getting sanctions relief and normalization, and essentially legitimization of the program that offends the entire nonproliferation system,” in a May 2021 interview with South Korean daily Dong-A Ilbo. Wong raised the alert that arms control talks “will ruin and take away the incentive for countries not to pursue nuclear weapons.”
Hooker in November 2024 reiterated, “I do think that denuclearization should be the goal. If we go directly to arms control talks, the North Koreans will not retreat back to the previous position very easily.”
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The Korea Herald is running a series that delivers a deep dive into the evolution of Trump’s second-term foreign and security policies — and the far-reaching implications of key strategic shifts for the Korean Peninsula and beyond. This is the first installment in the series. -- Ed.
dagyumji@heraldcorp.com
