China has been quite the wet blanket in international efforts to seek stronger sanctions against North Korea.

In the period between North Korea’s fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6 and the point when China finally agreed on the new United Nations Security Council resolution, Beijing repeatedly called for dialogue and negotiations, knowing full well they would fall short of curbing Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition.

The Chinese government’s duplicity can be attributed to the coexistence of two factions in China. One views the North as a strategic asset, and the other sees it as an economic-diplomatic burden.

Furthermore, given the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China within the framework of the new Cold War standoff in Northeast Asia, China’s sensitivity toward the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system is also understandable.

Such considerations are critical for Seoul, for which Beijing is a key partner, both historically and economically. As such, Seoul is compelled to apply diligent and thoughtful diplomatic strategies toward China.

However, if Beijing continues on a path of disrespect for South Korea’s security concerns, Seoul must voice its opposition.

For South Korea, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are a matter of life or death, whereas for Beijing, it may be little more than an issue of overflowing defectors and an occasional act of defiance toward its leadership.

China has already shown it is willing to accept North Korea’s nuclear weapons as a fact by insisting on dialogue while knowing that this alone is futile in disarming North Korea. It also tried at first to detour the UNSC resolutions against the Pyongyang regmime, though it ultimately agreed to it. This means that China indirectly endorses the strategic value of nuclear weapons in the hands of its only ally in the region.

China’s opposition to South Korea’s efforts to reinforce its security -- either independently or in the framework of an alliance with the U.S. --  is like demanding that South Korea remains naked and vulnerable to the increasingly formidable nuclear threat from the North.

The rising tension brought about by North Korea’s recent provocations is pushing the South Korean public to look in two directions. There is growing resentment toward Beijing’s unilateral and interventionist opposition to Seoul’s defense efforts. There is also a call for the U.S. ally to expand or strengthen its nuclear umbrella. 

Toward China, the following questions are posed: “If the THAAD system is deployed in South Korea, how and why should the radars that will be attached to the system bother China, given that it also possesses nuclear weapons and operates more than 200 satellites?” and “Isn’t stopping the North’s nuclear arms a quicker and simpler way to delay or even stop the THAAD deployment?”

Toward the U.S., these questions are asked: “How much longer should South Korea remain wholly dependent on the U.S.’ nuclear umbrella without its own nuclear leverages against China and North Korea?”

Reflecting these questions and concerns, an increasing number of South Koreans are demanding that the Seoul government develop its own leverages over China rather than lodge complaints about Beijing’s dual stance.

Theoretically, the best way to keep both Pyongyang and Beijing in line would be for Seoul to independently pursue a nuclear weapons arsenal.

For South Korea, which is heavily dependent on external factors for its economic survival, this plan seems implausible since it not only counters U.S. nonproliferation policies but would mean a violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) framework.

However, the U.S. has the power to quell South Korea’s security concerns without seeing Seoul opt for such radical measures. This could involve critically reinforcing its nuclear umbrella to include full-time deployment of strategic submarines in the East Sea or reintroduction of U.S. air-based tactical nuclear weapons.

Washington also needs to heed the fact that the U.S. has been denying South Korea not only from nuclear armament, but also from peaceful use of spent fuel, such as enrichment and reprocessing, which are not prohibited by the NPT.

In a nutshell, many South Korean strategic planners believe that the U.S. will undermine the spirit of alliance if it continues to discourage Seoul’s atomic activities in this manner.

They believe it is time for the two allies to reshape the alliance cooperation framework so that South Korea can have more security options, including nuclear potential, and thus exercise more military deterrence as well as diplomatic leverages vis-a-vis North Korea and China.

For example, the U.S. should support, not dissuade, South Korea’s pursuit of its own nuclear-propelled strategic submarines.

Now may be the right time to revise the ROK-U.S. alliance treaty and introduce new paradigms for the alliance cooperation between Seoul and Washington. The revision, if any, will have to include an “automatic intervention” clause as is the case in the NATO treaty and a pledge for protection under the nuclear umbrella, which has been confirmed through the annual Defense Ministers’ Meetings since 1978.

South Koreans now want the U.S. to become a true ally in helping South Korea become more secure and independent within the boundaries of the NPT. This would serve not only to protect Seoul but to strengthen the alliance.

If the two nations consider themselves as a blood ally based on the spirit of “Gachi Gapshida” or “Let’s go together,” this is what they must do in a time when North Korea pursues boosted fission bombs and hydrogen bombs, beyond atomic bombs.

It is critical for Washington to see that South Korea is becoming increasingly weary of turning helplessly to Beijing and Washington each time a provocation occurs from the North. It is time for Seoul’s friends to act.

By Kim Tae-Woo

Kim Tae-woo is professor at Konyang University and a former president of the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). -- Ed.