This is the fifth installment in a special New Year’s series of interviews with preeminent scholars on international politics and security. ― Ed.


Improving its strained ties with China will be at the top of North Korea’s foreign policy agenda for this year, a political scientist said, stressing China still remains the most crucial economic and political partner for the isolated state.

Last year, Pyongyang was seen to have beefed up its diplomacy with Moscow and Tokyo amid growing estrangement from Beijing. But Kim Yeon-su, a professor of security policy at Korea National Defense University, said the moves could be intended to grab Beijing’s attention, to a certain degree.

“North Korea’s annual trade volume is around $7 billion, and China remains its largest trading partner, accounting for some 90 percent of all of its trade,” Kim said during an interview with The Korea Herald.

“Its trade volume with Russia is only a little over $100 million. So this indicates that when it comes to trade and economic relations, no other country can replace China. Well, South Korea could perhaps do so, but China is still the most important partner for the North.”

Touching on the issue of “strategic culture” ― the orientation of a country’s thoughts, perceptions and preferences regarding the use of force and its overall security stance, Kim noted North Korea is uniquely characterized by its bellicosity, strong resistance to external interference, self-reliance and military-first policy line.

“This culture has been formed through formative historical experiences such as of being in a geopolitically vulnerable position stuck among big powers. To change it would obviously take a long time, and to do so the North would have to redefine its national interests,” he said.

The following is the interview with professor Kim.

Korea Herald: What is your assessment of the last three years of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s state management?

Kim Yeon-soo: We first need to examine Kim’s disposition as a leader, namely his identity, given that a leader’s disposition determines his areas of interest and policy priorities. That said, I think Kim has presented himself as a military ruler … as a hereditary successor for the military-first policy. His father Kim Jong-il did not reveal himself too much during his on-site military inspections. But Kim Jong-un has gotten down to the real nitty-gritty of military drills and made hostile comments against the South too explicitly, as we have recently seen him posing on a tank, submarine and combat plane. I think he enjoys it. With him deeply engrossed in the military, economic issues seem to have been put on the back burner, although he has said he will see to it that his people don’t have to tighten their belts anymore.

Another thing to note is his capability. One aspect of a leader’s capability is the ability to manage the ruling elites. The North’s ruling class is a mixture of young and older generations and for this, a North Korean leader needs finesse to lead the top echelons. … His father, Kim Jong-il, was able to directly control and secure a firm grip on the elites, with whom he built and maintained close ties through thick and thin as he was being groomed as a successor for a long period of time. But Kim Jong-un did not have that kind of capability upon taking power.

The problem is that the internal and external realities facing the North call for a more flexible, shrewd (style of) leadership. If we look at the process through which Jang Song-thaek (Kim’s once-powerful uncle) was executed, we can get a sense of Kim’s leadership style. Jang was tried at a military court, beaten and bruised. This is apparently an immoral behavior, which may have flabbergasted and petrified the elites. For his regime to fare well, particularly in its beginning stage, it needs to maintain stable relations with China and South Korea, and for that, there should be a figure who can manage external relations well. The North has sent Choe Ryong-hae overseas instead of the ill-fated Jang, but Choe can’t compare to Jang in terms of diplomatic skills and level of credibility from an outsider’s perspective. Thus, the way Jang was purged illustrates Kim Jong-un’s lack of personnel management capability.

We also need to look at his policy management capability. Internally, there appeared to have been some changes: He brought his wife Ri Sol-ju to the fore, talked of catching up with the world trends and (acheiving) economic recovery. But these moves appeared to have receded following the execution of Jang. On the diplomatic front, the North reached the Feb. 29 agreement with the U.S. in 2012, but reneged on the deal. What matters most was that the North failed to improve relations with China.

In terms of inter-Korean relations, the North brought the situation to the brink of war in early 2013 and attempted to shut down the joint industrial park in Gaeseong, and these moves have restricted South Korea’s policy options. After all, Pyongyang has compromised its own interests through such policy flip-flops. With an immense desire for power, Kim exercises his leadership in a very repressive, coercive fashion, which might have had an impact on the elites ― mostly a negative impact in terms of eliciting voluntary loyalty from the elites.

KH: What is your forecast for how Kim will rule the communist state following the end of the three-year mourning period for his father?

Kim: Given its deepening isolation, some change is apparently needed. This year marks the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the North’s ruling Workers’ Party, and the elites and common people will have higher expectations about what the regime can do. So, the regime is facing pressure to live up to these expectations by improving relations with the outside world and the economy as well. To this end, the regime should seek a change in its ruling ideology or style. But the prospect of such a change remains dim for those who heard his New Year’s address.

(In the address) Kim clarified his stance of … simultaneously pursuing economic and nuclear development. Thus, we can hardly expect Kim to change his military-centered ideology. But when it comes to his ruling style, there could be (some changes) should a situation arise ― a situation where he has to manage external relations in his own favor.

Speaking of governing style, Kim is more open and in touch with the public than his father, which appears to be a way for him to overcome the weaknesses of his leadership. He may attempt to get closer to the people to create an image of a friendly leader and reinforce his legitimacy, and in this process, he may consider a change in his ruling style. But we can’t expect any change regarding his governing ideology.

KH: What do you think about the likelihood of the North pushing ahead with a fourth nuclear test this year?

Kim: The North has already made it clear that it will continue to increase both the quality and quantity of its nuclear capabilities. This appears to be a steadfast policy, and for the North (to carry out this policy) it will have to continue its nuclear tests just as the existing nuclear powers did. Thus, we can say that another nuclear test remains a possibility. But to successfully carry out various political events slated for this year and further strengthen his legitimacy, he needs to disentangle the strained ties with the outside world. The key to that is (progress on) the nuclear issue.

How Kim meets the international community’s expectations regarding its denuclearization is of paramount importance, and should he press ahead with another test, that would shatter all these expectations. Thus, there is a need for restraint, but there is a possibility of a nuke test according to changes in domestic politics and external relations. So uncertainty reigns.

KH: Tension has escalated between the U.S. and North Korea as Washington slapped Pyongyang with new sanctions for the alleged cyberattack on Sony Pictures. Do you think the frayed ties between the two will work to the detriment of inter-Korean dialogue and relations?

Kim: In retrospect, for the inter-Korean relations to fare well, the Washington-Pyongyang ties also had to be stable, not to mention the Seoul-Washington relations. Thus, all three relationships should move along well, so to say, to create some sort of a virtuous circle. Currently, the North-U.S. relations are faltering, and under these circumstances, it would be difficult, in realistic terms, for the South to unilaterally push for its own policy without factoring in the deterioration in the Washington-Pyongyang relationship.

This is partly because of the need for policy coordination between the allies. The South has requested that the U.S. delay the transfer of wartime operational control, and that the U.S. reinforce its extended deterrence in light of the evolving nuclear threats from the North. Thus, considering the need for closer security cooperation between the allies, there are many areas in which they should work closely together. Also of note is that should there be any potential progress on the North’s denuclearization, inter-Korean relations could move forward considerably. To forge a positive outlook for the nuclear issue, U.S. cooperation is of great importance, as we need to persuade China to move. Thus, strategic cooperation between the allies on the nuclear issue is very crucial.

Some people say that we can make a “detour,” meaning that rather than directly tackling the sensitive nuclear issue, we can deal with other issues first to forge the mood for dialogue (on the nuclear issue) and so on. But after all, we will converge on the nuclear issue at some point anyway (even if we initially sidestep the issue).

The two Koreas may be able to create the mood for dialogue, and start holding working-level talks, and then higher-level dialogue. But for the inter-Korean summit to occur, they cannot help but touch on the nuclear issue. Without moving toward a resolution of the issue, public sentiment could also work against the summit. In short, for now, it is difficult to paint any positive outlook for Washington-Pyongyang relations and this could work as a risk factor for inter-Korean relations.

KH: how do you predict the North will deal with its external relations? It seems that the North should improve these relations to ease its global isolation.

Kim: North Korea’s annual trade volume is around $7 billion, and China remains its largest trading partner, accounting for some 90 percent of all of its trade. Its trade volume with Russia is only a little over $100 million. So this indicates that when it comes to trade and economic relations, no other country can replace China. Well, perhaps South Korea could, but China is still the most important partner for the North. So enhancing ties with China will be one of the North’s main foreign policy goals for this year.

Although the North has recently ramped up its diplomacy with Japan and Russia, that doesn’t mean that it will put all its energy into (improving its ties with) these countries, while nudging China off its list of priorities. I think the recent diplomatic moves have more to do with Pyongyang’s intentions to grab the attention (of China). The biggest foreign policy task for the North is to gain China’s recognition of Kim’s legitimacy, perhaps through a bilateral summit. China has yet to offer any clear recognition of Kim’s legitimacy, as Kim seeks security autonomy from China and moves forward in his own way, while China wants the North to move in the direction of denuclearization, reform and openness.

Having said that, the North will focus more on improving its relations with China. For better relations, the North should show that it has been trying to live up to China’s expectations. China wants the North to negotiate over its nuclear program and move toward reform and openness.

KH: International pressure on North Korea to improve its human rights conditions has increased. Do you think this pressure will have a positive influence?

Kim: I remain positive about it. The universal principle of human rights is one of the rare effective means to influence North Korea, a country that has long been advocating for its own uniqueness and distinct position. I think that the fact that the North has started to respond to the pressure is important in itself. The human rights issue has been brought to the fore on the international stage through a U.N. resolution and other efforts. And this has contributed to encouraging the North to talk with the international community and engage more deeply with the outside world. For South Korea, such pressure is an addition to its list of tools to persuade the North to change.

KH: How would you describe North Korea’s strategic culture, and how will it affect its foreign policy decisions?

Kim: Strategic culture is about a country’s orientation of thoughts on security, and North Korea has its own unique culture characterized by bellicosity, fear of encirclement, strong resistance or an allergic response to outside interference, self-reliance and a military-first policy line. This culture has been formed through its historical experiences: It was once put in a suzerain-tributary relationship in a Sino-centric order and has been in a geopolitically vulnerable position among big powers. The turbulent process whereby its national founder Kim Il-sung consolidated his leadership and internal political legitimacy, and established his self-reliance principles has also influenced the strategic culture.

Then the question is whether this culture can change. Well, we can approach this question from a constructivist view. The North should first redefine its national interests, meaning that it should believe that not self-reliance, but engaging with the outside world would better serve its interests. The North should not see the U.S. as its archenemy, and should confidently allow a U.S. embassy to be established in the heart of its capital Pyongyang.

To change its strategic culture, the North should redefine its interests at the leadership level and the level of the elites. Should they churn out thoughts about what would best serve their national interests, they could lead to a change in behavior, then in political culture, and then in their thoughts about security, and then finally a shift in its strategic culture. This is a very fundamental question, and something that takes a lot of time. Should there be a political leader like Mikhail Gorbachev (of the former Soviet Union), well (such a change) could transpire. Who knows?

KH: Do you think the way China looks at North Korea has changed? China apparently saw the North as a buffer zone state, but that kind of perception seems to be fading as China emerges as a major power seeking diplomatic clout that matches its enhanced global status.

Kim: From the standpoint of military strategists, geopolitical variables are still important, although some scholars may say that the idea (of North Korea as a buffer zone state for China) is no longer relevant. For the U.S., Taiwan is still something it cannot give up ― a reason why some call it a “floating aircraft carrier.” Without Taiwan, Japan may feel very vulnerable, and the efforts to maintain the sea lines of communication around Taiwan could be undermined. If we also consider the U.S.’ strategic rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific, China may continue to pay strategic attention to these geopolitical variables. But what is noteworthy is that the Xi Jinping generation appears somewhat different from the Hu Jintao generation. For the Xi generation, “China’s dream” appears to mean getting closer to the code of conduct and rules that are in line with international standards ― a reason why Beijing is striving to stamp out corruption. …

What the Xi government wants Pyongyang to do is to move toward denuclearization, reform and openness. And this is actually what China has called for since the era of Deng Xiaoping, who was against the North’s dictatorial ruling system and encouraged it to focus on economic development. But the intensity of such demands from China appears to have increased under the Xi government. This is because China’s status has changed and also because China is pursuing a different status.

Thus, there appears to be some change in the level of China’s expectations for the North and this is apparently putting considerable pressure on the North. Well, this may be a reason why the North has sought to secure more security autonomy in a preemptive manner, and it is therefore difficult to predict how North Korea-China relations will develop this year.


Kim Yeon-su

● Kim, a professor in the security policy department of Korea National Defense University, has focused his research attention on North Korea’s foreign policy, inter-Korean relations and the overall East Asia security.

● He has assumed various advisory posts for key government agencies including the presidential office’s National Security Council and the Defense Ministry. He also headed the KNDU’s center for North Korea studies from 2006-2012.

● His major publications include “North Korea’s Security and Military Strategy under the Kim Jong-un regime”; “Characteristics and Stability of the Kim Jong-un Regime: Focused on Power Elite Analysis”; and “A consideration of North Korea’s Hardline Domestic and South Korea Policy: Focused on Succession Politics.”

● His research articles also include “Strategy for Regional Cooperation for Resolving North Korea’s Nuclear Issue” and “North Korea’s United Front Tactics against South Korea.”

● He obtained his bachelor’s, master’s and doctorate degrees in politics from Sogang University in 1990, 1993 and 2003, respectively.

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)