Pyongyang sharply raised military tensions on the peninsula this spring, threatening to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes against what it calls hostile forces including South Korea and the U.S.

China may feel increasingly frustrated by its ally’s recalcitrance, but it may still think a regime collapse in Pyongyang would be “calamitous” as it could set in motion a string of economic, security and political problems, he noted.

“They (China), I think, have been surprised by how undisciplined North Korea has been with the young leader, and almost insulted that the little brother has not treated the big brother in the way customs of the past have been organized,” he said.

“But I sense they don’t like the prospect of a regime collapse, and they want to use their leverage on their client state, but not to the extent that it generates the risk of a collapse.”

He cited the loss of Chinese investments in the North, refugee inflows, the prospect of a unified Korea affiliated with the U.S. and a subsequent loss of a buffer zone state as potential risks Beijing may fear a regime collapse would bring about.

Despite such risks, concerned parties should try to persuade China to think that there would be options that would serve its national interests after the end of the autocratic regime.

“It is important for us to talk to China to think about that based on the assumption that the regime is not going to last forever, what would be the most acceptable outcome post-crisis. Some friends in China called a controlled unification,” he said.

Touching on the possibility of Pyongyang abandoning its nuclear program, the professor said that without Beijing exerting its potent leverage, the North would not renounce it given that it is now “tied to the identity of the regime.”

“I don’t see anything other than whatever China can do in terms of a truly physical existential leverage threatening a regime collapse through withholding energy and so forth,” he said.

With regard to President Park Geun-hye’s initiative to build a comprehensive dialogue for peace and prosperity in East Asia, Ikenberry stressed the need to bolster regional security cooperation.

“The multilateral security framework in the region is very thin and very underdeveloped,” he said.

He, in particular, pointed to the need for regional cooperation on arms control.

“It won’t be like the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) talks between the U.S. and Soviet Union,“ he said.

“But it will be more like a confidence-building process of dialogue, of promoting transparency and a restraint, possibly looking for areas where there can be either moratoria on weapons development or ceilings put on deployments of various sorts and, finally, there needs to be a mechanism for crisis management.”

But he noted the process of establishing a new institution similar to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe could face some hurdles due to the conflicting interests of the participants.

Launched in 1995 as a permanent tool for confidence building, human rights protection and other security purposes, the OSCE takes its roots in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ― a peace initiative, dubbed the “Helsinki process,” that forged the momentum to entrench peace in a divided Europe during the Cold War.

Park sought to learn from the Helsinki process to build an East Asian version of it.

“China would want to keep human rights, democracy and the rule of law off the table, which are central to the OSCE. The U.S. would want to guard against challenges to the alliance system, which I don’t think are very severe,” he said.

A more practical question as to crafting another security institution would be what it means for existing regional forums including ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit

“Do we want yet another organization? What does it mean for these other dialogues? If you want to do more, do you build that on one of the existing institutions? Those are questions that would be tough ones,” he said.

As to the deepening historical animosities stemming from Japan’s failure to fully recognize its wartime aggression, the professor noted the real problem for Japan would be its deteriorating image.

“It has fashioned a way of being a great power without resorting to the traditional military power approach ― the position that Japan built partly out of necessity, but also by making it a virtue as a global stakeholder and articulate spokesperson for comprehensive security,” he said.

“It is a pity it did not take one step further and find a way to put to rest these historical issues. Japan wants to be a beautiful country ― that is the language of the new prime minister ― but that requires other countries to see the beauty and to be part of the coalition of states that follow and work with Japan.”

Ahead of the upper house elections next month, Japanese conservative politicians including Abe have churned out provocative remarks that showed their unwillingness to acknowledge the country’s atrocities during World War II including the forced prostitution of Asian women.

From the perspective of the U.S., which has recently been refocusing its diplomatic and military assets in the strategically crucial Asia-Pacific amid the rise of China, the provocative moves by its key ally Japan could be worrisome.

“From America’s perspective, one would wish Japan well and would like to see it be a truly regional heavyweight providing influence and be a well-situated partner,” he said.

“I think the U.S. would like to see Japan playing a less provocative role in the region to allow its true assets, its impressive records in clean energy, its ability to innovate and be an economic leader. All these things can come to the fore if some of these negative political controversies can be put to rest.”

As to the Tokyo leadership’s moves to revise the peace constitution to allow the country to have a full-fledged military and engage more actively in overseas military activities including one that would support its ally, the U.S., Ikenberry expressed caution.

“At the technical level, it is necessary for Japan to position itself constitutionally so that it can engage in security cooperation. But what it doesn’t want to do is to take away what has been a real asset for it, which is the peace constitution and the special role it has seen for itself as a semi-military state as opposed to a full military state,” he said.

“So, I don’t share the enthusiasm of a lot of others for a ‘normal’ Japan. It is not that I don’t trust Japan, but I do think it would have a negative impact.”

As to the future security, political landscape in the region, he envisaged a “more complicated, more balance-of-power type” of Asia. But he dismissed the idea that U.S. allies such as South Korea would be forced to choose between the U.S. and China amid their intensifying rivalry.

“South Korea and Japan do not have to make a choice between benefiting from the economic rise of China and benefiting from the security protection of the U.S.,” he said.

“The rising China creates incentives for countries like South Korea and Japan to have a balance of power, to have an outside power like the U.S. as a hedge, and we have seen that alliance system can coexist with a very intensive economic relationship with China.”

In the end, choices of smaller states like South Korea and Southeast Asian states would determine the mix of how the two superpowers would have their roles in the region, he added.

Noting the South Korea-U.S. alliance has turned into a platform for wider security cooperation that deals with terrorism, proliferation and even non-human threats such as global warming, he highly evaluated its evolvement over the last six decades.

He also hoped the alliance would continue to serve as a “bedrock partnership and core component of regional security.”

John Ikenberry

● John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at the Department of Politics at Princeton University and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul.

● He has authored numerous essays and books including “Liberal Leviathan ― The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American System” (2011), and “After Victory ― Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars” (2001).

● His book, “After Victory,” won the 2002 Schroeder-Jervis Award presented by the American Political Science Association for best book on international history and politics.

● Ikenberry worked as a member of an advisory group at the State Department from 2003-04. He also worked as a member of the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on U.S.-European relations, the so-called Kissinger-Summers commission. He is also a reviewer of books on political and legal affairs for Foreign Affairs.

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)