It is certain that North Korea will not abandon military and non-military provocations for its strategic purposes. Now, one of the interesting questions we have is “what will be next?”

Recently, North Korea dealt a war-like psychological blow by informing the U.N. Security Council of a simmering nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, which sufficiently demonstrated how ready North Korea is to challenge the international community.

As a means for continuing and escalating the level of such irrational behavior, North Korea might consider a withdrawal from the U.N. as its next strategic card to play.

North Korea made a similar decision in 2003 when it withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to be free from its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Unfortunately, the U.N. Charter does not include any relevant provision for the withdrawal of U.N. members.

In the history of the U.N., Indonesia’s unilateral decision of withdrawal from the U.N. in 1965 was the first and last case.

At the time, the Indonesian government made the decision in responding to Malaysia’s admission into the U.N.

The U.N. defined Indonesia’s withdrawal as a “cessation of cooperation,” not a withdrawal.

Within a year, however, Indonesia resumed membership. It is very unlikely that North Korea would decide to withdraw from the U.N., but the possibility should not be ruled out as North Korea seems willing to consider all available options to increase its clout in negotiating with the international community.

Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, North Korea has to pay explicit and direct costs caused by its withdrawal from the U.N.

The most apparent cost is a suspension of international humanitarian aid from the U.N.

In addition, the international community reacts by consolidating its efforts to implement international sanctions on North Korea.

From North Korea’s view, such costs would not be that fatal as North Korea is already suffering from continuing and massive economic sanctions by the U.N., the EU, the U.S., and other individual states.

The U.N. Secretariat would not recognize immediately North Korea’s unilateral decision of withdrawal.

While North Korean decision-makers discuss a decision of withdrawing from the U.N., this expected ― quite realistic ― response by the U.N. might contribute to reducing their psychological concern and burden.

Although it is not certain what strategic benefits could be given to North Korea, we could take into consideration the following: First, as Kim Jong-un has gone too far to reverse course without some rewards, he is attempting to sharpen a strategic wedge with the international community, thus increasing political cohesion among his close hardliners. If he stops now, his political leadership would be much damaged both domestically and internationally.

Second, to overcome a current deadlock with the international community, it is critical for North Korea to draw diplomatic support from China, which now plays a more responsible role than before in implementing international sanctions on North Korea. China is searching for a way in which it can resume dialogue including North Korea for discussing North Korean issues.

Third, the U.S. government would not just sit back in the event of North Korea’s withdrawal from the U.N. The U.S. government does not rule out the possibility of talking with North Korea. If deemed necessary, Washington would not refuse a meeting with North Korean representatives in New York like the two secret visits to Pyongyang in 2012.

Fourth, North Korea is likely to manipulate the strategic mindset of some policymakers in the Park Geun-hye administration who cautiously advise building political trust between the two Koreas through increasing economic exchanges before dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program.

Would North Korea’s withdrawal from the U.N. matter to South Korea? Yes, however, South Korea does not have an effective means in responding to the withdrawal. If North Korea by any chance succeeds in giving rise to international discussion over its withdrawal from the U.N., South Korea’s initiative in dealing with the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula would be likely to weaken greatly. 

By Park Jinho

The writer is a legislative assistant to Rep. Hwang Jin-ha of the ruling Saenuri Party and a non-resident fellow of the Korea Defense & Security Forum (KODEF) in Seoul. ― Ed.