This is the fourth in the series of articles on the growing rivalry between the U.S. and China and its implications for the two Koreas and East Asia. ― Ed.


China’s new leadership should be the driving force for much-needed changes to tackle its social, political, economic and demographical challenges. But it may fall short of having the mandate required to carry out reforms the emerging global power is badly in need of, a leading historian and peace researcher cautioned.

On top of it, for incoming leader Xi Jinping, growing nationalism may be a major hindrance to overcome in pushing for a practical, future-oriented external policy concerning territorial, historical issues, said Stein Toennesson, senior research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo.

“I fear Xi will become a similarly bleak or weak leader as his predecessor. The system, by which all new top leaders are around 60 years old, is not good for situations that require bold reforms,” he told The Korea Herald in an email interview.

In the party’s top echelon, there has been a delicate balance of power among factions, due to which observers argue Xi may have difficulty immediately pushing for new policy initiatives until he consolidates enough power within both the party and military.

Xi belongs to the “Princelings,” an elite clique consisting of high-ranking communist officials’ children and cronies, while Li Keqiang, who is set to become premier, belongs to the Communist Youth League faction, which former party leader Hu Jintao has led.

Another influential clique is the so-called Shanghai Gang, which consists of former President Jiang Zemin and his proteges. Xi is known to have backing from both the Princelings and the Shanghai Gang.

Regarding North Korea, Beijing may seek to tie its impoverished neighbor to the Chinese economy through trade and other means while trying to stabilize the regime both politically and economically, which could, hopefully, lead to its reform, he said.

On South Korea’s diplomacy focusing mostly on its long-standing alliance with the U.S., he said Seoul should pay more heed to its strategic interest in maintaining good ties with Beijing.

Academia has been divided over this issue.

Some argue that relations with China are crucial as it is the South’s largest trading partner and the most influential state to help achieve the shared goal of peninsular denuclearization. But others argue that in the reality of competitive international politics, it is quite challenging to maintain both the alliance with the U.S. and a strategic relationship with China amid their intensifying rivalry.

Following is the text of the interview with Toennesson.

The Korea Herald: The leadership changes have taken place. Do you predict any change in the U.S. and China’s policies toward each other? Many argue both will seek to maintain the status quo as Xi Jinping focuses more on domestic challenges including the massive income gap and political reform, while the U.S. is expected to remain relatively low-key amid its policy of austerity. 

Stein Toennesson: I think there will be some tension between the U.S. and China concerning currency and trade. There will be a need (for the U.S. president) to deliver to the electorate on promises to stand up against China in the defense of American workers. I, thus, fear that the free trade system is in for a rough ride, although the term “trade war” is probably too strong.

KH: How do you think the Sino-U.S. rivalry will develop in the coming decade with Xi taking China’s helm? What do you think about the prospect of China becoming a revisionist to challenge the U.S.-led regional, international order?

Toennesson: I see a risk that China will overestimate its own strength in relation to neighboring states, and that Sino-Japanese tension may bring in some U.S. action. If there is a real crisis, then China will probably need to back down, since it has nowhere near the power it takes to confront the U.S. and its allies. This is unlikely to change as China has to face formidable internal challenges. Hopefully, Xi will understand that tackling China’s internal challenges requires a flexible and moderate foreign policy, aiming to rebuild trust with China’s neighbors. He has a chance to repair some of the damage done by ill-advised policies under Hu Jintao. But Xi will face the same pressure from an overly patriotic public. So, getting China back on track, with regional confidence-building, will require some real leadership skills and authority on the part of Xi.

KH: What will be the major sources of friction in the relationship between the rivals?

Toennesson: I think the main source of friction between China and the U.S. bilaterally is in the field of trade. My sense is that the U.S. will not increase its emphasis on human rights as long as it has such serious economic problems. Arms sales to Taiwan will also not create much friction as long as President Ma (Ying-jeou of Taiwan) keeps Taiwan on a moderate course. What I fear the most in the field of security is new incidents between the two Koreas, perhaps again regarding the disputed Northern Limit Line (the de facto maritime border), and incidents between China and Japan, which may draw in U.S. action.

KH: How do you think Xi will handle maritime territorial disputes with countries like Japan and others in the region?

Toennesson: I’m afraid that he will continue to use them as lightning rods for Chinese nationalist impulses. To overcome this temptation and engage with China’s neighbors in a constructive way will require a stronger leadership than Xi will be able to provide. But the possibility is there. The rational thing for China to do in relation to Japan is to put the dispute over the tiny Diaoyu/Senkaku rocks aside and instead, approach the real issue, which is to negotiate the maritime boundary between China and Japan. It will, sooner or later, end up as a compromise somewhere in the middle between the Chinese claim on the basis of the prolongation of the continental shelf principle and the Japanese claim based on the median-line principle. Why not do it sooner rather than later and, thus, open up the prospect of some serious exploration for oil and gas? If the China National Offshore Oil Company knew its own best interest, it would try to encourage Xi and Li Keqiang (set to become premier next year) to engage Japan in genuine negotiations with a real willingness to compromise.

KH: How do you expect Sino-Japan relations to develop amid the rise of China?

Toennesson: The current trend is deeply worrisome, with weak leadership on both sides, and a strong impact from nationalist sentiments. My hunch is that reason will supersede the current tensions, once new and more stable governments are in place. China and Japan depend very much on each other for their economic well-being. So my guess is that the spats will be put aside, and hopefully the two governments could even begin to negotiate in earnest the maritime boundary between them, and perhaps return to the plan for joint development in areas where the dispute cannot be resolved.

The historical issues will continue to haunt bilateral relations, though, until a new critical generation of historians and intellectuals on either side is able to subvert the traditional narratives and be overtly critical of their own national past.

KH: What do you think about major domestic and international challenges for Xi to handle and overcome?

Toennesson: The need for domestic action will dominate his agenda. He needs to make structural reforms that reduce the impulses towards corruption that are built into a system where central positions in the Chinese Communist Party are a key to success in business, if not for the same person then for his family members. It will be an extremely difficult task to separate the party and the main government institutions from the powerful commercial sector interests. But this is absolutely necessary if the regime shall avoid going into a clear path of decay.

In the economy the overall challenge is to stimulate the internal market, so China becomes less dependent on external trade, but this will increase imports as well and, thus, probably reduce China’s trade surplus.

And, if thinking ahead, Xi needs to quickly abandon the one-child policy and stimulate child-rearing, instead, so that there will be someone to carry the burden of China’s growing number of old people in the future.

KH: What do you think about what China lacks for now to become a global leader?

Toennesson: China has just started on the course of developing a global policy of a kind that does not just pursue its own narrow interests, but aims to develop a stable global environment. The most promising and constructive part of this policy is the effort China has undertaken to create a global currency.

But for a long time ahead, maybe for the rest of the century, China will have to cope with a situation where the U.S. remains the world’s dominant power. It is also not at all a given that sinking U.S. power will be replaced by increasing Chinese power. China may run into some serious problems in the next decades, and the real test for the party will be its ability to manage and survive a general economic backlash.

KH: What do you think about the importance of so-called soft power for China to become a great power?

Toennesson: I think China has an enormous potential for soft power, given the country’s rich historical and cultural traditions. However, this will not be achieved through coordinated campaigns organized by government institutions. China’s soft power will assert itself more and more as innovative skills and intellectual freedom continue to grow. For some strange reason, Japan remains more inward-looking. I think Japan is already feeling the strong competition on the global level from China’s growing soft power.

KH: Do you think China’s policy toward North Korea could change under Xi?

Toennesson: My sense is that China does not either want or feel that it can put too much pressure on (North Korean leader) Kim Jong-un to give up the North’s nuclear programs. What China may be doing, is to tie up the North to its own economy through trade and also some import of labor. China will also do its best to convince Kim Jong-un to institutionalize his regime, strengthen the civilian sector and reduce the military burden on the country’s weak economy. If this succeeds and a modicum of economic growth occurs, this, then, could provide room for the emergence of a North Korean reform faction. And, then some change could begin also politically. If this happens, then hopefully, there will be a South Korean leadership as well, who sees its chance and re-engages with Pyongyang in the way that was done 10 years ago.

KH: South Korea appears to be in an increasingly difficult position as the Sino-America rivalry intensifies. Do you have any policy suggestions for Seoul to maintain good ties with Beijing, while not compromising the long-standing alliance with the U.S.?

Toennesson: South Korea was unlucky to carry out its sunshine policy at a time when it could not get support from the U.S., and to get a president with no sunshine policy at a time when there might have been a chance to get U.S. support for it. The South should follow closely the relationship between China and North Korea in all fields, and understand how much it is losing out by not being part of what could become some real social and economic and finally political change in Pyongyang. I fully understand that the South must put the main priority on keeping up its alliance with the U.S., and America’s commitment to the alliance, as long as it faces a North Korea with a nuclear program, enormous artillery massed at the other side of the Demilitarized Zone and an extremely aggressive rhetoric. But the South’s future peace depends also on its ability to keep close ties with Beijing and being able to take part in managing the changes that will sooner or later happen in the North.

KH: There are concerns about differences between Seoul and Washington over North Korea’s denuclearization. Seoul wants to denuclearize the North while the U.S. focuses more on non-proliferation though its ultimate goal is denuclearization. What do you think about these policy gaps Seoul may have to cope with?

Toennesson: I think a policy of denuclearization is highly unlikely to succeed through pressure. Denuclearization will only happen in connection with the future political change in North Korea, involving confidence-building between the two Koreas. Thus, it will be better for the South to do as the U.S. and China may seem to be doing, and concentrate on non-proliferation. But the main thing is to stimulate processes building room for internal change in the North.

KH: Any more comments you want to add about the leadership changes?

Toennesson: I fear that Xi will become a similarly bleak or weak leader as his predecessor. The system, by which all new top leaders are around 60 years old, is not good for situations that require bold reforms. And Xi will have to cope with resistance from the factions and interest groups in the party if he tries to carry through change. So what I fear is not China’s rising power, but a weak, reactive and unsuccessful leadership. The ramifications (of the weak leadership) might be of two kinds. First, there could be increasing unrest inside China, and second, the government could be driven to reckless or irresponsible actions vis-a-vis other countries, for fear of defying public opinion. 


Profile

● Dr. Stein Toennesson is a Norwegian peace researcher and historian. He currently serves as senior research fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Norway, and leader of the East Asia Peace Program in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at the Uppsala University, Sweden. Founded in 1959, the PRIO is a renowned independent institution in peace research on policy and practice.

● He has conducted extensive research on a wide range of areas including East Asian peace, maritime conflicts, oil and security, the South China Sea, nationalism and national identity, communism and political leadership.

● He served as a Jennings Randolph senior fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., from 2010-11. From 2001-09, he served as director at the PRIO. From 1995-98, he worked as senior research fellow at the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen.

● He received “Candidatus philologiae” (equivalent to master’s degree) in French and history at the University of Oslo in 1982 and a D.Phil. in history at the same school in 1991.

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)