President Lee Myung-bak used to say his power would remain intact until his final day in office, brushing aside the possibility of sliding into lame-duck status in his last year in office, as his predecessors did. Set to enter into the final year of his five-year presidency soon, however, he needs to look squarely at irksome truths about his crumbling power base.

When his administration was inaugurated on February 2008, Lee looked so indomitable that all his detractors, both actual and potential, had to keep a low profile. They included Rep. Park Geun-hye, a former chairwoman of the ruling Grand National Party, whom he had defeated in the race for the presidential nomination. In other words, no challenge to his authority was conceivable at the time.

More than two months are left until he starts his final year in office. But power has already shifted to Rep. Park, with those close to President Lee forced out of the party’s leadership positions. Now being promoted as the party’s leader again, Park says she will soon reorganize the party in the way she finds fit ahead of the parliamentary elections in April and the presidential vote in December.

Worse still, Lee may be shown the exit from the party in the process of reorganization. That possibility is mentioned by those lawmakers who regard him as more a liability than an asset for the forthcoming elections. One of them says that if he severs his ties with the party, he can remain neutral and better manage the next elections. Such a nicety, however, is nothing but a veiled demand that he leave the party.

Indeed, it may be a matter of time until he quits. One lawmaker loyal to him says he may dissociate himself from the party on his own. Should he do so, either under duress or voluntarily, he would follow the footsteps of his predecessors, who had to administer state affairs with no assistance from the party when their presidencies neared the end.

Another sign of a president’s weakening power is an increase in the number of criminal investigations into his protgs and relatives.

A case in point involves President Lee’s brother, a leading lawmaker in the party, whose chief secretary is accused of taking 750 million won in bribes and laundering the money through bank accounts held by other aides. The lawmaker, who claims innocence in the case, is most likely to be summoned by prosecutors to testify. Another case involves one of the first lady’s cousins, who was recently arrested on bribery charges.

Moreover, some former aides to the president have been sent to prison and some others are under criminal investigations. Bribery charges against them have dealt a deadly blow to the Lee administration, which he once claimed to be “morally perfect” because his election was financed with no illegal contributions from businesses.

What is weakening the power of the president is institutional to a large extent. Few are found to remain loyal to the president, who is constitutionally banned from pursuing a second term, when he can no longer be relied on for his patronage.

But the loss of the moral high ground is more responsible than the constitutional ban. True, none of the presidents has been directly implicated in bribery scandals since the nation shed its authoritarian legacy in the 1990s. Their images were nonetheless tainted when some of their relatives were found to have peddled influence for money and people they installed in public office were found to be disreputable, incompetent, corrupt or all three.

An additional problem, which is specific to Lee, is his failure to make good on his promise to raise the annual growth rate to 7 percent, aiming to raise the per capital income to $40,000 and make Korea the seventh wealthiest nation in the world. The 2012 growth forecast has recently been lowered to 3.7 percent.

What is done cannot be undone. It is of no use to begrudge the onset of his lame-duck status. All he needs to do now is accept the decline in power magnanimously, administer state affairs smoothly and complete his main projects on schedule.