The latest public uproar over juvenile delinquency has been fueled by two terrible cases, both involving girls (incidentally, the far less delinquent gender). Firstly, four middle school students in Busan brutally beat a 14-year-old girl. Publication of video footage of the attack along with a photo of the blood-soaked victim and the main perpetrator’s dismissive text messages caused this incident to go viral. Then an 18-year-old girl who had abducted, murdered and mutilated an 8-year-old girl in Incheon was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Believing juvenile delinquents are no longer deterred from committing violent crimes because they are aware of the apparent leniency of the juvenile law, hundreds of thousands of concerned citizens have petitioned the government to revise the law in favor of harsher punishments. But policy must be based on evidence, not emotion.

This emotion-driven reaction is essentially about the relationship between perception and policy. Criminologists have noted that two opposing views are generally put forward to explain delinquency. The first view understands delinquency to be committed by self-centered adolescents who, lacking self-control and empathy, do not care about the feelings and rights of others. The delinquent is therefore perceived more like a hardened criminal than as a child. The second view understands juvenile delinquency as a “cry for help” from juveniles who come from abusive and neglectful family environments. The delinquent is therefore perceived more as a child than a younger version of a hardened criminal.

These ideas of delinquency subsequently inform the perception people have of juvenile justice. Those who view the juvenile like a ‘gangster’ are more likely to advocate punishment and deterrence-based policies; even though a comprehensive review of intervention measures has found them to be the least effective. Conversely, those who view the juvenile as a victim of maladaptive circumstances are more likely to favor reform and rehabilitation-based policies; which the review found to be the most effective policies.

If the delinquents really are the way they are perceived, then the proposed policies should work when put into practice. But if the delinquents differ from the perception of them then the proposed policies will not work -- and may make the problem worse.

In my book “Bullying and Violence in South Korea: From home to school and beyond” I sought to understand South Korea’s juvenile delinquent. The book was conceived during the last public uproar over violent teens following a spate of bully-suicide cases between 2011 and 2013. The public perception was that violence in schools had become more “rampant,” was occurring earlier and cruel and “cold-blooded” students had become more “organized” (like gangsters). But archival data reveals there has been, since the 1950s, cyclical and perennial public uproars over violence in schools.

It is also claimed statistics indicate juvenile delinquency is increasing. Yet a proper review of the data does not support this perception. In fact, researchers have consistently found low rates of physical violence among South Korean students. And a comparison of youth panel surveys conducted 2003-2008 and 2010-2016 show rates of “severely teasing” and “collective bullying” have decreased substantially in the last few years.

Most importantly, my research shows the perpetrators of school violence have been subjected to the following cross-cultural predictors of delinquency -- high levels of parental divorce, absence, neglect, authoritarian violence, inconsistent maladaptive parenting and socioeconomic disadvantage. This means they were victims at home before (and while) they were perpetrators at school.

Calls for harsher punishment fail to address these developmental handicaps facing juvenile delinquents. Evidence indicates that harsh sanctions (institutionalization, incarceration) exert a negative “criminogenic” effect -- it reduces educational and employment opportunities yet increases bonding with delinquent peers and is thus more likely to lead to continued criminal involvement.

By contrast, evidence shows that family management-based methods that reduce “authoritarian” parenting, programs that improve cognitive-behavioral skills, vocational education and employment training all provide the strongest opportunities for transitioning away from criminal offending.

While it is understandable to want to yell at delinquents “What is wrong with you?!” a more important question to ask is “What has happened to you?”


By Trent Bax

Trent Bax is an assistant professor in sociology at Ewha Womans University. -- Ed.