The Korean guerrillas who operated along the east and west coasts under the U.N. Command during the Korean War had previously been anti-communists in the North Korean regime. With the intervention of the Chinese forces, to reclaim their homeland in North Korea, they evacuated to islands near Pyongan and Hwanghae provinces and continued their armed resistance with the support from the U.S. Army.

The anti-communist guerrilla resistance in the Korean War began in the early stages of North Korea’s invasion. In regions occupied by the North such as Gangwon and Gyeonggi provinces, small-scale but sporadic movements arose, carried out by villagers who enlisted themselves into civil guerrilla units. At the same time, our Army organized the Myeong Unit and Death-Band Guerrilla Units to carry out sabotage missions in the rear of North Korea and its occupied territory. Guerrilla tactics were also employed by the U.S. Army and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Like KATUSA and KSC (ie. A Frame Unit) supported the U.S. regular army, the 8240th unit organized from guerrillas assisted in U.S. guerrilla warfare. Its main operations were combat missions and additionally some intelligence gathering from the islands near the North. The aid from the locals in the North was also important.

After intervention in the middle of Oct. 1950 by China, the tide of the war turned back to favor the North. The battle lines were pushed southward until they were stabilized at the 37th parallel in early 1951. By then, U.S. 8th Army chiefs of staff for operations put back on their agenda deployment of North Koreans in the rear operations. With small-scale landing operations, these forces aimed to divert North and Chinese forces and aid the U.N. forces at the 38th parallel.

The U.S. Army first began its comprehensive review of guerrilla activities when the Korean navy informed it of the guerrilla operations and called for aid in ammunition. In Jan. 8, 1951, the chief of 95.7 mobile unit in the Korean Navy sent a request to chief of the 8th Army to furnish 10,000 volunteer soldiers, who retreated to Haeju, Sariwon and west of Hwanghae, with Japanese 99- and 38-style ammunition style, Soviet arms and some carbine rifles. In addition, the U.S. Army ascertained the presence of a small guerrilla unit between Wonsan and the Eastern front, and sought to explore ways to utilize it.

Following the request, U.S. 8th Army replied that the ammunition and the weapons would be rendered while instructing its intelligence department to examine the strengths and possible uses of the volunteer army. Subsequently, the U.S. Far East Command ordered the 8th Army to organize and operate anti-communist guerrilla forces. Given adequate supply and strategic use, it was assessed that the anti-communist guerrilla forces would pose a substantial threat to the communist side.

At one point, the size of the 8240th unit grew to over 20,000 men. While it was a huge accomplishment, it also weakened the characteristics of the guerrillas. Strategic objectives were not adjusted to the growing size of the unit and solidarity with the regular army and other units were not effective. As a result, operations were scanty, scattered and unable to achieve decisive victories. From a tactical perspective, there were little development of long-term strategies and operational forms were limited to ambushes and raids for the two years. This was one reason for the negative evaluation of the guerrillas.

Nevertheless, landing operations and intelligence-gathering effectively blocked the advance of the communist army and decentralized the enemy forces to the whole coastline, weakening their combat strength. Sabotage missions in the rear helped weaken the morale of the communists. By then, as U.N. ships, aircraft and navy personnel had the command of the east and west coast, infiltration was possible. At the same time, guerrilla operations were the basis behind the defense of five islands in the west sea from Gwanghwado Island to Daehwado Island.

Unlike KATUSA and KSC, the 8240th unit commandos carried out mostly self-initiated missions. Sacrifices of commandos in the course of action had reduced the damage that otherwise, could have been inflicted on the ROK and U.S. Army.

While some of the operation results had been overstated, the ill-trained and inexperienced guerrillas – with the exceptions of a few U.S. officers who experienced World War II -- killed more than 10,000 soldiers, destroyed supplies depositories, railroads and bridges, and rescued refugees and U.N. pilots from the crash. Such accomplishments helped divert at least two North Korean and the Chinese army divisions. Such a diversion alone should be considered a considerable contribution.

As large as the accomplishments were the sacrifices of the guerrillas. Choi Dong-ha, commander of Donkey-3, Park Chil-sung, commander of Donkey-7 and 3,000 guerrillas fell in the battlefields. On Nov. 30, 1951, when Donkey-15 unit was attacked by the Chinese army in Tando and Daehwado, You Tae-young, Jung Gwang-nam, Choi Gwang-jo and other leaders of three regiments were all killed. In August, 1952, Donkey-16 were attacked by the Chinese forces while stationing at Oesundo. The guerrillas put up stiff resistance but lost due to numerical inferiority and the commander, Yang Chang-ryeol also killed himself.

The guerrillas were not employed by the U.S. Army, but enlisted voluntarily as a private army of Korean guerrillas. The guerrillas had no serial number or rank in operations. However, when the guerrillas returned to their hometowns or were recruited into the army after the cease-fire, they were regretful that their sacrifices were swiftly forgotten.

Every year on Memorial Day or units’ foundation days, the survivors would pay respects to the memorial monument and be mournful for not receiving proper recognition for their actions. They were especially discontent with being classified as a foreign legion just because they were under the command of the U.S. Army. To the guerrillas, what mattered most was not about crediting their accomplishments but passing on their spirit and morals, serving as the beacon of anti-communism for the three years.

The achievements of the anticommunist guerrillas in the Korean War, although one might say they were limited, should be an essential guide to operating guerrilla and other special units. 

By Cho Sung-hun

Cho Sung-hun is a Senior Fellow at the Military History Institute. –Ed.