Kicking the can down the road does not solve the problem. It may buy some time but the moment of truth will come soon. Through the recent AIIB and THAAD issues, we are now learning it the hard way. Delaying a decision or even making no decision at all has been described as a deliberate choice of “strategic ambiguity.” While we kept dodging reality, the once quiet courtship has turned into a direct request, and the direct request is now almost becoming diplomatic pressure. 

Strategic ambiguity only works if one country remains noncommittal on a particular issue so that it can have a wide choice of policy options. The art is to keep others guessing your real intent. The moment others know what the county thinks, its strategic value just fizzles out.

Regarding AIIB and THAAD, Korea’s procrastination and pronounced indecisiveness are already telling others what we have in mind ― being at a loss, torn between the two key players in the region ― and there is nothing ambiguous about it. Since Korea’s position is evident to others, including the Americans and Chinese, the purported strategic ambiguity has apparently failed to deliver.

While we are agonizing over the two difficult issues, high-ranking diplomats from Washington and Beijing visited Seoul to make their affirmative cases. Now, whatever decision is made, the smoldering discontent of both countries is likely to remain.

Splitting the prize may be an easy way out ― one for the United States and the other for China. After all, it seems that the two issues are now being finally aligned in that direction: Korea is leaning toward joining the new China-led bank, while accommodating the THAAD battery in Korea. But again, despite the split, both countries will not be happy.

The two issues wise us up to the difficult challenges and pressure, both economically and militarily, that Korea has to face in the treacherous landscape of the Sino-U.S. confrontation. On some issues, Korea may be able to successfully navigate through the narrow passage of the two countries’ competing interest and satisfy both. But there are also other issues that simply deny such leeway and a decision must be made one way or another.

These hard questions simply do not offer a box of “I do not know” or “none of the above.” While Korea keeps checking these boxes over and over again, the time is suddenly up and quick choices have to be made while the proctor is approaching. A firm stance on a particular issue based on a careful assessment of the long-term national interest may have caused some uncomfortable discussions and consequences, but would have saved and will save a lot of trouble down the road. Judged from a standpoint of national interest, answers to these two questions are arguably obvious from the beginning.

A big steel safe is before us and we need to open it. The lock of the safe has two wheels ― a U.S. wheel and a China wheel. The door will open only with the correct alignment of these two wheels with accurate turns of the dial stopping at precise numbers. What we need is such accuracy and precision as opposed to “being nice” to all partners at all times.

Ambiguity is indeed necessary and sometimes the best strategy. A choice of strategic ambiguity, however, must be deliberate rather than accidental. Strategic ambiguity is no substitute for indecisiveness and procrastination. Making a mistake is disastrous. Taking no decision for fear of making a mistake is even more disastrous. 

By Lee Jae-min

Lee Jae-min is an associate professor of law at Seoul National University. ― Ed.