Recently, “Eurasian Initiative” and “New Silk Road” have become catchphrases in Central Asia, China and South Korea. The U.S. announced a “New Silk Road” initiative back in June 2011, Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposed a new overland Silk Road initiative and a maritime Silk Road project in September and October 2013, respectively, while Russia officially launched the Eurasian Union in May 2014. South Korean President Park Geun-hye has joined this Eurasian integration movement by announcing her own plan. There are other similar proposals, including Turkey’s Silk Road project.

Can all these Eurasian integration movements work harmoniously or be integrated into a single project? In order to find the answer to this question, it is necessary to examine first the purposes of these projects and the differences and similarities between them. The U.S. approach emphasizes the improvement of security in Central and South Asia through enhancement of regional cooperation in trade, energy and transportation. By doing so, the U.S. intends to assist those countries in their transition to free markets and democracy.

Russia’s objective is to create an EU-type of regional organization in the now almost defunct Commonwealth of Independent States excluding the three Baltic States and including Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, Russia aims to bring the former Soviet republics into its sphere of influence through a gradual process of integration.

Aware of these two former Cold War leaders’ political intentions, China emphasizes that its project is purely economic and social and politically neutral. China’s concept of Eurasia includes all European states and East, Central, South and West Asia, while Russia’s encompasses mainly Central Asia. In terms of leadership, Russia openly leads its movement, while China stresses cooperative efforts but actually leads its project. The U.S. discreetly leads its project by providing financial and technological aid. As far as the relationship between these three projects is concerned, the three great powers do not envisage any joint and coordinative efforts for Eurasian integration.

The above reveals that the three great powers have gotten involved in a power struggle in Eurasia. This tripartite power game reminds us of the Great Game between Russia and Britain in the 19th century. Gorbachev said at the Berlin Wall on the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall that a new Cold War had already begun. But this new Cold War is not between Russia and the U.S. but among Russia, China and the U.S. One of them can play the role of balancer between the two others or side with one of the others. In the old Cold War, China sided with the U.S. against the former Soviet Union, but this time Russia is likely to side with China against the U.S.

Where does South Korea’s initiative stand? It is in the most advantageous position among all the initiatives. First, its initiative is based on the principle of mutual cooperation. This means that South Korea’s proposed programs are overlapping with the other ones, particularly China’s, but South Korea proposes joint projects in transportation, logistics, energy infrastructure and superspeed information networks. It also advocates the ultimate integration of Western and Asian civilizations, which none of the great powers does. It does not place the Eurasian community above other regional organizations; it rather emphasizes connectivity-building in Eurasia, not political or economic integration as the final goal, and close relationships with, not the exclusion of, the E.U. in the West, ASEAN in the South and NAFTA across the Pacific. More important is that South Korea, a unified Korea, can play the role of mediator among the great powers in conflict.

President Park is trying to relate her Eurasian initiative to peace and security in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. She seems to believe that for Eurasian integration Russia and China should and can persuade North Korea to join their projects and that if North Korea joins them, the physical barrier between South and North Korea can be lifted and this will eventually to lead to peaceful coexistence between them.

Whether North Korea will be persuaded or not depends on whether and to what extent its leadership will become desperately concerned about its economic condition. Moreover, China and Russia are unlikely to pressure North Korea to join South Korea’s Eurasian project or their own projects mainly because they think that by antagonizing the North Korean leadership they will lose more than they gain. At the moment they are more concerned about the implications of their policies toward North Korea for their relationships with the U.S. and Japan than with South Korea. South Korea is faced with a similar problem because the U.S. is pushing for its own Eurasian initiative.

Another problem with all the Eurasian initiatives is that their final goals are not clearly defined. China talks about a Eurasian Economic Community, Russia a Eurasian Union similar to the E.U., and South Korea a Eurasian Economic Zone initially in the form of a Eurasian Free Trade Area. But it should be reminded that Russia opposes any kind of multilateral free trade area, economic community or political union in Central Asia except its own Eurasian Union. The ultimate goal of the E.U. is a political union. The U.S. is also likely to have a similar policy for different reasons. In view of this situation, the best and most realistic approach of the Eurasian initiatives is connectivity-building first and the establishment of bilateral free trade agreements between the participating countries next. South Korea should lead this approach.

By Park Sang-seek

Park Sang-seek is a former rector of the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies at Kyung Hee University in Seoul. He is the author of “Globalized Korea and Localized Globe.” ― Ed.