Contingency plans needed for N.K. upheaval

With concerns over a possible change in the North Korean political situation, voices have been raised by some pundits to quickly put in place contingency plans should there be a sudden upheaval in the regime structure.

However, any effective contingency plan would require the assistance of China. As of now, officials from Seoul and Washington have not been able to discuss the issue with Beijing due to the latter`s reluctance.

Last month, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg tried to broach the subject of North Korea contingency plans when meeting with Chinese officials in Beijing. Those efforts were politely rejected by his counterparts.

In an interview with The Korea Herald, Drew Thompson, the Director of Chinese Studies at the Nixon Center, outlined his concerns over the lack of cooperation between the region`s major players. Thompson says if the regime in Pyongyang were to suddenly collapse and its weapons facilities were not immediately safeguarded due to lack of coordination, the consequences would be dire.



Korea Herald: The question of regime stability in North Korea has led many experts to ponder the contingency plans in place should the regime collapse. China recently rebuffed American efforts to discuss these issues. Can you explain the reasoning behind Beijing`s reticence?

Drew Thompson: China is reluctant to discuss contingency planning for North Korea`s collapse for a number of reasons. First of all, China prefers the current status quo and would therefore prefer not to consider the possibility of a future paradigm where there is no DPRK on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea provides China with strategic depth, preventing other powers from stationing hostile troops on its borders or using the peninsula as a land-based invasion route.

In addition, the regime in Pyongyang provides preferential access to raw materials and markets for Chinese commercial interests and has the potential to boost economic development in China`s economically depressed Northeast provinces. These security and commercial advantages would be lost if North Korea were to collapse and be replaced by a pro-Western, pro-South Korean regime.

At this point the DPRK exists to China`s advantage, outweighing the disadvantages brought by Pyongyang`s provocations and troublesome non-traditional security threats, making Chinese strategists unwilling to discuss the prospect of a change of regime. Chinese scholars have accused Western experts of exaggerating the fragility of Pyongyang`s grip on power, arguing that China will not allow North Korea to collapse, making any discussion of contingency planning irrelevant and needlessly provocative.

Secondly, there is concern that North Korea would find out about Chinese planning and react in an unpredictable way. The DPRK leadership could consider it an act of aggression and retaliate, or express displeasure by other means such as cutting off contact with China or abrogating contracts with Chinese companies.

Thirdly, there is also concern that any open discussion of contingency planning would undermine the authority of the current leadership and possibly spark a crisis of confidence, perhaps amongst key constituencies such as the Korean People`s Army, resulting in the regime-changing crisis that they are actively seeking to avoid.

Lastly, contingency planning would almost certainly include conceptualizing an intervention by Chinese military units. Any prospect of Chinese civilian or military-led units crossing the border into North Korean territory is at odds with long-standing Chinese foreign policy principles of non-interference. Beijing is concerned that an intervention might elicit fear of China`s rising power in the region, at best leading to more robust hedging by East and Southeast Asian neighbors and at worst, the formation of alliances against China.



KH: Do you believe China does indeed have its own contingency plan in place?

Thompson: Chinese scholar-officials have admitted privately that China has some form of contingency plan. Chinese and Western experts both generally agree that this is prudent and responsible. However, Chinese officials have made clear their objections to discussing such plans. Despite China`s reluctance to openly discuss contingency planning for North Korean collapse scenarios, we can assume that China has several key priorities and objectives for any hypothetical intervention.

First, security is a priority for the Chinese military and is a scenario for which they are reportedly planning. Second, the restoration of law and order within North Korea, which would minimize human security challenges and potentially prevent a humanitarian crisis, is critical to reducing the pressure on North Koreans to flee to Chinese territory. Third, preventing chaos from spilling into Northeast China is another key priority, though the threat that this poses is debatable. Chinese scholars have stated that the threat of tens or hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees flooding into Northeast China is overstated.

China has invested heavily in planning and infrastructure that would enhance border security and mitigate the affects of a humanitarian disaster in the area, particularly since the previous humanitarian crisis brought on by famine in North Korea in the mid-1990s. Infrastructure investments in disaster relief and border security, including in the provinces bordering North Korea, make it likely that China could effectively manage a refugee crisis brought on by a sudden and unexpected development on the peninsula.

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KH: South Korea and the United States are also working on their own contingency plans (CONPLAN 5029 or OPLAN 5029). Are they moving in the right direction in your view? Also, how effective would this plan be without closer cooperation from Beijing?

Thompson: U.S.-ROK contingency plans are highly classified and a sensitive issue between the two countries. Unlike China, South Korea does not have to worry about Pyongyang accusing Seoul of allying with the U.S. against it, but similar to Beijing, neither Seoul nor Washington wants to needlessly provoke Pyongyang. This makes it difficult for all sides to press ahead with planning and coordination.

Coordination is considered vital to the success of any plan and the lack of coordination between all three capitals, particularly coordination between Seoul and Beijing, is a cause for concern. Equally important is the need for discussion with other international stakeholders. The United Nations would undoubtedly play a role in providing humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts and needs to be considered in all planning endeavors.

Likewise, international government and non-government aid agencies would contribute to efforts to deliver humanitarian aid and address human security needs, such as food and shelter for displaced persons. This argues for a non-governmental coordinating process which would be unclassified and require inputs and coordination with government agencies.

The emergence of government and non-government bilateral and multilateral disaster relief coordination and information sharing mechanisms since the Tsunami disaster can provide a possible basis for planning to address humanitarian requirements in the event of a disaster on the peninsula. This type of planning might be less politically sensitive and lay the groundwork for better communication and coordination in the event of a possible humanitarian disaster brought on by a sudden change in North Korea.



KH: You`ve stated that a chaotic situation in North Korea is not probable but would be catastrophic. Can you describe a potentially "catastrophic" situation?

Thompson: Information about the situation within North Korea is anecdotal but generally disturbing. Without authoritative and comprehensive data it is difficult to accurately determine how resilient North Korea would be should a destabilizing event occur, which partly explains the persistent perception that North Korea is on the verge of collapse.

While that very collapse is debatable, there is extensive speculation about how a collapse or breakdown of authority would occur. Regardless of the wide range of assessments, clearly the major concerns would include food shortages and human security challenges such as banditry and the possibility of large numbers of displaced persons. Addressing the immediate law and order needs, human security issues would be a priority for China as well as the rest of the international community.

From the regional and global security perspective, the failure to account for and control all nuclear materials and other conventional weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons stockpiles would qualify as a catastrophe. Securing the facilities and materials with these weapons programs in the DPRK is a critical priority for China as well as the U.S. and its allies. The failure to secure WMD facilities materials in the event of the collapse of state authority could result in mass casualties.

Additionally, should North Korean WMD materials fall into the hands of rogue army units, terrorists or criminal syndicates, such a development would constitute a grave threat to global security.

KH: Recent reports suggest that Beijing may be taking a sterner stance against Pyongyang? Do you believe this to be the case?

Thompson: The DPRK`s recent provocations including their second nuclear test and missile launches in 2009 have clearly angered Beijing. Following the nuclear test, there was a clear effort on the part of Chinese scholars to shape elite public opinion in China.

Numerous op-eds and interviews by scholars signaled to educated Chinese that Beijing`s relationship with North Korea was no longer absolute and that North Korea was undermining China`s interests. The effort enabled policymakers in Beijing to take a sterner stance towards Pyongyang without upsetting Chinese domestic public opinion of their own policymakers.

Following the second nuclear test, China appeared more willing to support UN sanctions than previously, and there is some evidence that China is actively, not just rhetorically supporting United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 which calls for sanctions against the DPRK`s nuclear and missile programs. China has expressed its support for stopping the proliferation of materials and technology from the DPRK, though it remains to be seen how active China will be in interdiction efforts, particularly on the high seas or in international airspace.

Following the most recent provocations, Beijing has reiterated its objective of a non-nuclear peninsula, though it remains unclear what strategy Beijing will employ to roll back the DPRK`s nuclear weapon and missile programs. Increased pressure through sanctions is one approach Beijing appears to currently support, but it considers sanctions to be a delicate balance because Beijing does not want to push the DPRK to the point that it retaliates, nor does it want to enforce sanctions that threaten to topple the leadership in Pyongyang.



KH: You wrote in a recent research report entitled, "The Real Bridge to Nowhere; China`s foiled North Korea Strategy," that China`s strategy in utilizing the Yanbian Prefecture as a "bridge" to further its interests in the Korean peninsula has not been successful. How important is Yanbian in the whole scheme of things and how problematic are lingering tensions over territory and history where as you point out, there is a mutual "mistrust" between China and the two Koreas regarding these issues?

Thompson: Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province is a very important aspect of China`s comprehensive relationship with the DPRK. It is a reminder that when China looks at North Korea, it sees a neighboring state with which it shares mutual interests, not an international pariah.

Yanbian with its large Korean population also represents a bridge to South Korea; one that Yanbian officials have hoped would bring trade and direct investment. Unfortunately, foreign investment and trade with both Koreas and Yanbian has failed to meet expectations, though many officials and policymakers remain optimistic about the future for the prefecture.

However, much as mutual mistrust between the U.S. and China underpins differences between the two nations, Yanbian is at the center of mistrust. Mistrust, however, does not need to define the China-ROK relationship, much as Sino-U.S. trade and investment has grown steadily for 30 years despite the lack of agreement on Taiwan and human rights issues. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that historic territorial tensions will dissipate on their own, even if trade and investment exceed both sides` expectations.

China has committed significant government resources towards confronting historical border territory disputes both on land and sea. While China has well publicized maritime disputes in its northern and southern waters, the tension over territory with Korea is a top priority. To give an example, the Chinese Foreign Ministry this April created a new department of border and maritime affairs.

The timing of the announcement of this new department coincided with the March deadline for declaration of maritime continental shelf claims to the United Nations. Notably, the director of this new division of the ministry was not a maritime law expert, but the former Ambassador to South Korea and graduate of Kim Il-sung University, Ambassador Ning Fukui. The placement of one of the Foreign Ministry`s top Korea experts in this position indicates the importance that Beijing places on Korean territorial tensions.



KH: Finally, if "status quo" is the end result of Kim Jong-il`s succession plans and the regime stabilizes, what do you foresee will happen in terms of the geo-political strategy in the region among the major players?

Thompson: Assuming that the transition of power from Kim Jong-il to his successor goes smoothly and the regime continues in its current state, there is little to indicate that there will be a dramatic geo-political shift in the region. The United States has clearly stated that it has no intent to attack North Korea, so there appears to be no exogenous threat to the DPRK`s continued existence. Without a dramatic change in the status quo, there is little indication that there would be major or rapid shifts in each party`s interests on the peninsula.

The regional dynamic will likely continue to be influenced by China`s "rise." The U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances will remain relevant and with or without the DPRK`s regime survival, the U.S. presence and commitment to the Asia Pacific region will remain constant. The continued expansion of China`s economic influence and military modernization will affect the balance of power in the region and create new dynamics that all the players will adapt to. Regardless of the DPRK`s uncertain future, U.S. interests in the region will undoubtedly closely associate with the ROK, Japan, China, Taiwan and other friends in the region.

(henryshinn@heraldm.com)





By Henry Shinn