South Korea should follow Clinton`s lead

In the aftermath of former U.S. President Bill Clinton`s brief visit to North Korea in which he successfully secured the release of two American journalists held captive there, analysts have been debating what the wider ramifications will be for East Asia.

Some pundits argue the White House claims that Clinton`s visit was purely a "private visit" aimed at freeing Laura Ling and Euna Lee should be taken at face value and that nothing further should be read into it.

However other experts say Clinton`s dramatic visit may set the stage to increased bilateral contacts between Washington and Pyongyang in the wider goal of reaching an agreement over North Korea`s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles programs.

In an email interview with The Korea Herald, noted North Korea expert Paik Hak-soon says Seoul should take heed of the recent Clinton visit and consider a more diplomatic approach in its Pyongyang policy. The Sejong Institute scholar urges policymakers to be proactive in engagement efforts lest South Korea becomes sidelined in subsequent rapprochement efforts between the United States and North Korea.



KH: Now that Bill Clinton has successfully returned from his Pyongyang visit with the two American journalists, what is your analysis on his trip and what do you think was accomplished?

Paik Hak-soon: The release of the two U.S. journalists is the immediate accomplishment, but more seriously, President Clinton`s visit played a catalyst role in ushering in a new U.S. policy of solving the key pending problems including the nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiations between the United States and the DPRK. Bill Clinton`s visit to N.K. could be compared with that of Jimmy Carter in 1994 in terms of making a breakthrough and changing confrontation and punishment into rapprochement and cooperation in the U.S.-DPRK relationship.



KH: Speculation is mounting that President Obama may have sent a "message" through Clinton. The White House denies this. What do you think this message could have been?

Paik: The reason why the White House is denying sending President Obama`s message to the North Korean leader and also is trying to characterize Bill Clinton`s mission as a "private" one is just for domestic consumption, that is, it has to take care of the domestic political atmosphere in which N.K. is perceived as an "evil" country among the public and at the Capitol Hill, more than anything else. Furthermore, the White House also needs to keep this visit at the low profile in order to avoid too high expectations on the North Korean nuclear resolution at this initial point.

President Obama`s message delivered to Chairman Kim Jong-il appears to have included the following: in addition to the request for the release of the two journalists, President Obama`s intention and will to solve the pending issues in the U.S.-DPRK relationship through sincere dialogue and negotiation in a comprehensive manner including the U.S.-DPRK normalization, and President Obama`s demand for N.K.`s return to the dialogue and negotiating table.



KH: Analysts are now trying to assess the effects of Clinton`s visit. Will this, as some believe, lead to further bilateral dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang regarding disarmament and security issues?

Paik: I agree to such a prediction. During the past few months, President Obama must have realized that "punishment" of N.K. itself, that is, pressure and sanctions on N.K. could not solve the nuclear problem in any possible way, dissatisfied with himself sort of repeating George W. Bush`s failed policy in dealing with N.K. So it was apparent that from mid-July the Obama administration began to put forth a new policy toward N.K. by saying "two-track policy," "a comprehensive package deal" with N.K., etc.

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It`s clear that President Obama was getting pressure to engage N.K. more aggressively from a timetable of holding a global nuclear summit in March 2010 and a NPT review conference in May 2010. In order to make world leaders agree to his vision "the world without nuclear weapons" in March next year and to strengthen the NPT based on the achievements in the global nuclear summit, Obama has to produce a tangible progress in the North Korean and Iranian nuclear cases.

On the other hand, Kim Jong-il of North Korea has pursued a coherent policy to end the Korean War at the earliest possible time, sign a peace treaty, and normalize with the U.S. and do just normal things like trade, financial and other cooperation and exchanges with the U.S. - this objective was clearly defined and pursued in the 1994 Agreed Framework and was repeated in the 2005 Sept. 19 Joint Statement - as an "exit" strategy since the collapse the Soviet Union, but more fundamentally, as an effort to establish a framework of survival in the external arena, that is, vis-a-vis the U.S. and international community.

Still more fundamentally, such effort was made for the implementation of the "strategy of survival and prosperity for the 21st century," the fundamental national interests of North Korea. So it was the very policy of N.K. to engage the U.S. aggressively for its own interests, but in an extremely cautious and defensive manner due to the concern that it should avoid any possible deception attempted by the U.S. side; otherwise it could fall a victim to the U.S. policy to do regime change in N.K. (Please read my explanation of N.K.`s perception of the U.S. attempts to "entrap" North Korea during the Bush administration even after the USG agreed to the Sept. 19 Joint Statement: http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/09009Paik.html)



KH: There are some concerns here that South Korea may be sidelined in further rapprochement efforts between the United States and North Korea. Will the Lee Myung-bak government have to adjust its policies accordingly?

Paik: Sure. Otherwise, the Lee government will continue to lose its voice in the nuclear and other security and peace-related issues, let alone in the national, inter-Korean issues. General public in South Korea will no doubt perceive a policy to help the United States and N.K. cooperate and reach a fundamental solution to the key pending issues is a good policy for the interest of South Korea. The Obama government, in a sense, already made it clear to the South Korean government, particularly though the recent visit of Assistant Secretary Kurt Campbell that there should be a new approach to N.K. to solve the nuclear and other important issues, talking about two-track policy toward N.K. and a comprehensive give-and-take. The only problem with Lee is how to persuade the conservative forces of our society to cooperate with his new initiative toward N.K., but that is what president is for, making critical, strategic choices and taking responsibility for his policy.



KH: Bill Clinton was known as a strong supporter of the Sunshine Policy. You were quoted in the media as saying the Lee government may face pressure to soften its stance in the future. Can you elaborate?

Paik: The voice to soften Lee`s stance toward N.K. and to seek a new reconciliatory and cooperative N.K. policy was begun to be heard immediately after the new report of Bill Clinton`s visit to N.K. That voice is getting bigger and bigger in our society including the ruling party itself. The South Korean policymakers appear to be fully obsessed to seek ways to release Mr. Yu, the abducted Hyundai worker, and the South Korean fishing vessel recently seized by N.K. in the East Sea. Objectively speaking, a negotiation with N.K. just like what the U.S. government did through Bill Clinton`s visit has to take place at this point. I hope the South Korean government will not lose time in beginning a process to send a secret presidential envoy to N.K. to solve the South Korean detainees and detained ship, but more fundamentally to begin the whole process of reconciliation and cooperation by honoring and implementing the two joint declarations - the June 15 and Oct. 4 declarations.



KH: Do you feel this so-called "comprehensive package" that may be on offer is going to gain momentum as a possible solution to the current nuclear and missile impasse?

Paik: Sure. That`s the only way of solving the problem. We`ve had two cases of such a comprehensive package deal in the past: Agreed Framework and September 19 Joint Statement. The problem was, as we all know, there was not a faithful implementation of them.

So this time, I am sure both the United States and N.K. will be determined to make a truly comprehensive give-and-take supported by a true, sincere will to implement it faithfully.

But the process of negotiation and reaching a solution will again have to go through a complex and time-consuming process considering N.K.`s defensive psychology as I pointed already above. It`s not easy to expect N.K. to be flexible enough due to its perception of disparity in power between the countries and any possible deception from the U.S. side; N.K. will be sticking to the "principle of simultaneous actions" as a defensive mechanism.

Therefore, Americans may not like it, but realistically speaking, it should be the U.S. that should begin trust-building by making the very first move to persuade N.K., and I think Bill Clinton`s visit to N.K. was it.



KH: You`ve also said that his recent visit may signal a return to "Clinton-style diplomacy" vis-a-vis the North Korea issue. What did you mean by that?

Paik: What I meant was that President Obama has just begun to overcome all the confusion in U.S. policy toward N.K. that Americans have experienced for the eight years of the Bush administration and the first several months of the Obama administration by realizing that "punishment" (i.e., sanctions and pressure only) cannot solve the problem; rather history and empirical data show that it worked exactly in the opposite direction, testified by the failed policy of the Bush administration.

The only solution is a renewed start of tackling the fundamental problems or "illness," the "symptoms" of which are nuclear and missile and other provocations; as long as the U.S.-N.K. confrontational structure, embodied in the Korean Armistice, survives, there`ll be another nuclear test, long-range missile test, and so on.

Such a fundamental approach to the "Korean Peninsula problem" was made during the Clinton administration: first, the 1994 Agreed Framework, which was not simply a nuclear resolution formula, but more fundamentally an agreement to lay the "foundation" of the U.S.-N.K. relationship in the new world of post-Cold War. (I would draw your attention here to the fact that the September 19 Joint Statement in 2005 was a repetition of the Agreed Framework; and George Bush reluctantly agreed to the joint statement due to the pressures coming from the six-party talks parties, criticizing the United States` non-action, more correctly the United States` hidden agenda to do regime change in N.K.); second, the October 2000 U.S.-DPRK Joint Communique, which was truly a great achievement that was to usher in a completely new, transformed era in the U.S.-N.K. relationship; both sides decided to "fundamentally transform" their relations by solving all key issues by tackling "illness" in a fundamental way.

North Korea`s invitation and reception of Bill Clinton, whose good will, sincerity, and achievements were fully remembered by the North Korean leadership, indicates that N.K. is also expecting a "Clinton-style diplomacy" from the Obama government; that is, it`s just like "let`s pick up where it was left off at the last months of Clinton years, even though we`ll honor the September 19 Joint Statement, but we don`t want to pick up where we were left off during the last moments of George Bush."



KH: It`s very difficult to predict how this dramatic visit will effect the overall situation, but can you offer some possible scenarios?

Paik: Considering the pressure coming from the timetable of the Global Nuclear Summit in March 2010 and the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, I`d like to predict that the Obama administration will probably begin dialogue and negotiation with N.K. in the fall and produce some tangible progress by the end of this year at the latest, or by the early next year still at the further latest. N.K. is already ready for talks with the United States.



KH: Finally, what would you advise the South Korean government to do now, especially as inter-Korean ties are at their nadir and Seoul is still wrestling with the issue of its own nationals still being detained in Pyongyang?

Paik: I`d like to strongly urge the South Korean government to learn from the U.S. example, which is taking place so dramatically through Bill Clinton`s visit to N.K. President Lee should restore South Korea`s leadership in inter-Korean relations by sending a "secret" presidential envoy to Kim Jong-il.

What President Lee can do to N.K. could be in parallel with what President Obama did to N.K.: dispatch a special presidential envoy, release the detainees and detained ship, and convey the will of the president to start anew the process of trust building and the problem solving through full engagement via dialogue and negotiation.

(henryshinn@heraldm.com)



By Henry Shinn