[EDITORIAL] OPCON question

If war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula before April 17, 2012, an American general will take command of all allied Korean and U.S. forces here under an arrangement that started during the Korean War 60 years ago. After the set date, Korean and U.S. forces will operate under separate commands while fighting together as the two governments agreed in 2007 on the transfer of the U.S. operational control to Korea.

Two years remain before Korea`s takeover of wartime operational control, a major decision made by the previous liberal administration. The plan faces mounting calls for a review from conservatives who argue that the "OPCON" change will undermine the overall defense posture because South Korea will not be ready to conduct war independently, even with U.S. support.

The argument for the continuation of the U.S.-led command system has grown. Some American experts published opinions that 2012 is too early to change the system. Michael O`Hanlon at the conservative Brookings Institution claimed that the idea of each country commanding its own military units after the handover "violates the basic principle of unity of command."

Bruce Bechtol at the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College observed that the South Korean military is still heavily dependent on the U.S. capabilities to deter and defeat the North Korean "asymmetric threat," which refers to the North`s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. In Seoul, Defense Minister Kim Tae-young expressed hope that the U.S.-led defense scheme will remain given the North Korean nuclear and missile threat.



We know that the transfer decision was the result of political motivations on either side of the alliance. Former President Roh Moo-hyun wanted to manifest Korea`s sovereignty by taking the operational control of its own forces. As for the Bush administration`s Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld and his "neo-con" colleagues, the OPCON handover was one way of bashing Korea, which was not cooperative in their charting of a global strategy with greater flexibility in military deployment.

Bad motivations, however, do not totally negate the validity of the decision, which was at least prompted by an intent to reshape the alliance to reflect political, economic and strategic changes. Two years may not be long enough for the South Korean military to secure independent war capability. Yet what is important is how the two allies will accelerate their efforts to prevent any weakness in their cooperative defense readiness under the given decision.

The Korea-U.S. alliance under the Lee and Obama administrations is stronger than in the preceding decades. At their latest summit, the two presidents vowed to build a broader, strategic partnership in all areas beyond the security arena. The power of trust had better be exhibited in constructively following up the decision made by their respective predecessors rather than in any kind of turning the clock back with the scrapping of the OPCON transfer.

The U.S. and Korean militaries are currently drawing up "defense guidelines" to upgrade bilateral defense cooperation. The United States, at the 2009 Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul, assured that they would provide "extended deterrence" for South Korea, using the full range of military capabilities - including the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike and missile defense capabilities. This commitment will remain valid after 2012.

If Seoul opts for a review, it may stir serious domestic controversy, just like the Sejong City issue, while Washington will perhaps show much less interest, as it tends to respect executive decisions made under past administrations.